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INTRODUCTION 
The fair use privilege of United States copyright law long 
stood virtually alone among national copyright laws in providing a 
flexible, open-ended copyright exception. Most countries’ copyright 
statutes set out a list of narrowly defined exceptions to copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights. Under such “closed catalog” regimes, uses 
that do not fall within one of the narrowly defined exceptions or 
limitations set out in the statute infringe copyright, unless licensed 
by the copyright owner. By contrast, U.S. fair use doctrine, as codi-
fied in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, empowers 
courts to carve out an exception for an otherwise infringing use after 
weighing a set of factors on a case-by-case basis.  
Thus empowered, U.S. courts have given free rein to various 
new technological uses of creative expression, as well as to copying 
from existing works to convey new meanings, information, or aes-
thetics. In the United States, Google’s Book Search Project –entail-
ing the mass digitization of university library collections to create a 
searchable database of millions of books -- was held to be fair use.1 
In France, a court held Google liable for copyright infringement.2 
Yet, in the face of rapid technological change, the last couple 
decades have witnessed widespread interest in adopting fair use in 
other countries. Fair use proponents emphasize that legislatures are 
hard pressed to enact new narrowly defined exceptions and limita-
tions that keep up with the rapid changes wrought by digital tech-
nology in markets and media for producing, distributing, and 
consuming creative expression. Indeed, fair use advocates view the 
                                                                                                             
1 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
2 Editions du Seuil v. Google Inc., T.G.I. Paris, 79 PTCJ 226, 1/1/10 (Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Paris 3ème Chamber, Dec 18, 2009).  
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pliable copyright exception as a vital engine “for innovation and in-
vestment in innovation,” a driving force behind the dramatic success 
of American technology companies.3 Nor, they argue, can a closed 
catalog of narrowly defined exceptions capture the full panoply of 
creative, secondary uses that enrich our culture, enhance our public 
discourse, or provide useful information. By contrast, judges can 
more adeptly apply open-ended standards and principles in cases 
brought before them to rule that certain socially beneficial uses do 
not infringe copyright.  
Thus far, the fair use model has been adopted, with some 
variation, in a dozen countries.4 They include the Philippines 
                                                                                                             
3 IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND GROWTH 44 (2011) [hereinafter “HARGREAVES REVIEW”]. See 
also AUSTRALIA LAW REFORM COMM’N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 104-08 (2013) (lauding fair use as an engine for inno-
vation); COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMM’N, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 93 (2013) (ad-
vocating adoption of fair use to spur innovation in Ireland). For a seminal 
discussion of how fair use might spur innovation, see Fred von Lohmann, Fair 
Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2008). 
4 By “fair use model” we mean a copyright exception that applies a flexible set of 
factors, including or drawing upon the four factors in U.S. fair use, and in which 
courts are empowered to apply the exception to uses beyond those that are specif-
ically enumerated in statutory provisions setting out the exception,even if the enu-
merated uses impose some constraint on the court’s discretion. As we discuss 
below, the U.S. fair use provision sets out a list of favored uses that are entirely 
illustrative examples, while the fair use law of countries such as Israel sets out a 
list of uses that is understood to impose some outside limit on which types of uses 
may qualify as fair use. Cf. Sean Flynn and and Mike Palmedo, The User Rights 
Database: Measuring the Impact of Copyright Balance, available at SSRN 
3082371 (2017) (characterizing “fair use” as completely open, flexible, and gen-
eral). 
For a helpful collection and typology of fair use model adoptions, see JONATHAN 
BAND AND JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (Poli-
cybandwidth 2013); Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS 1 
(2018) [hereinafter Yu, Customizing Transplants]. Fair use is not the only open-
ended copyright exception that proponents have advanced. Some proposals would 
fashion an open-ended copyright exception from the three-step test set out in sev-
eral multilateral intellectual property treaties as a limit on permissible copyright 
exceptions and limitation. See, e.g., ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Recommendation 11 (2006). 
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(1997),5 Liberia (1997),6 Sri Lanka (2003),7 Singapore (2004),8 
Canada (2004),9 Israel (2007),10 Taiwan (2007),11 South Korea 
                                                                                                             
5 Section 185.1 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 
No. 8293) is virtually identical to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act except 
that it states explicitly that the decompilation of a computer program “may also 
constitute fair use.” 
6 Section 2.7 of the Copyright Law of the Republic of Liberia is virtually identical 
to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, except that it does not apply to the 
reproduction of a computer program. 
7 Sections 11 of Sri Lanka’s Intellectual Property Act (Act No. 36 of 2003) is 
virtually identical to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright, but includes a long list of 
specific uses that are to be permitted without the copyright owner’s authorization 
and refers to those uses as “acts of fair use.”. 
8 Singapore Copyright Act (Chapter 63), Sections 35-37 (setting out a “fair deal-
ing” exception that is structured as an open-ended fair use exception).  . 
9 Canada’s fair dealing exception was long thought to provide a closed list of uses 
that could qualify for the exception. But beginning in 2004, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has ruled that the specific permitted uses enumerated in Canada’s fair deal-
ing statute must be given a large and liberal interpretation and thus impose a low 
threshold, and that, in determining fairness, courts are to apply factors that overlap 
with those of U.S. fair use.  Those rulings, together with Canadian Parliament’s 
addition of parody, satire, and education to the list of enumerated uses, has 
brought a leading Canadian copyright scholar to conclude that “the current Cana-
dian fair dealing regime now more closely resembles a flexible, open-ended fair 
use model.” Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from 
Fair Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
157 (Michael Geist ed., 2013)[hereinafter COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY]; see also Ar-
iel Katz, Fair Use 2.0; The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada, in COPYRIGHT 
PENTALOGY, id., at 93.  
10 We discuss the relevant provision, Section 19 of Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, 
in detail in the text below. 
11 Copyright Act 2016 art. 65, translated in Intellectual Property Office, 
https://www.tipo.gov.tw/public/data/61221027271.pdf (Taiwan). 
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(2011),12 Malaysia (2012),13 Kenya (2014),14 Ecuador (2016),15 and 
South Africa (2018).16 China also appears poised to adopt an open-
ended copyright exception in a proposed revision to its copyright 
law, and some Chinese courts have already asserted the authority to 
permit uses that do not appear in the closed list of exceptions cur-
rently enumerated in China’s copyright statute.17  Copyright revi-
sion commissions in Australia, the European Union, Hong Kong, 
                                                                                                             
12 Copyright Act, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 14,083, Mar. 
22, 2016, art. 35-3 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Copyright Commission, 
https://www.copyright.or.kr/eng/laws-and-treaties/copyright-law/chapter02/sec-
tion04.do; see also Sang Jo Jong, Fair Use in Korea, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Feb. 
27, 2017), http://infojustice.org/archives/37819 (offering a brief discussion of the 
origin and operation of the fair use provision in South Korea). 
13 Copyright Act, 2012, arts. 9, 13 (Malaysia), translated in BAND AND GERAFI, 
supra note 4Error! Bookmark not defined., at 38. 
14 See Victor B. Nzomo, In the Public Interest: How Kenya Quietly Shifted from 
Fair Dealing to Fair Use, WIPO-WTO IP Colloquium Research Paper Series 
2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929252, discussing 
Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Lim-
ited & 5 others [2014] eKLR. 
15 Organic Code on the Social Economy of Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation 
(Ecuador), arts 211-12. Article 212 of Ecuador’s copyright statute sets out a list 
of types of uses that are presumptively permitted so long as they meet the flexible 
test of factors, modelled on those in U.S. fair use doctrine, set out in Article 211. 
But Article 211 also envisions that uses other than the favored uses enumerated 
in Article 212 may qualify as fair use. We are indebted to Ecuadorian copyright 
expert, Byron Robayo, of the Quito law firm Paz Horowitz Abogados S.A., for 
clarifying this point.  
16 Republic of South Africa, Copyright Amendment Bill B 13B—2017. The Bill 
has been enacted but not yet signed into law. Peter Yu has authored especially 
helpful, illuminating studies of fair use variants in other countries. See Yu, Cus-
tomizing Transplants, supra note 4; Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and its Global Para-
digm Evolution, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 111 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Global Paradigm 
Evolution]. 
17 See Yu, Customizing Transplants, supra note4, at 11 (describing China’s pro-
posed Article 43). In 2011 The Beijing Higher Court ruled in 2013 that, in excep-
tional circumstances, uses that are not among the enumerated exceptions in 
China’s Copyright Law may qualify as permitted uses. Google, Inc. v. Shen 
Wang, No. 1221 Gaominzhongzi (Beijing Higher Ct. 2013), described in Yong 
Wan, Similar Facts, Different Outcomes: A Comparative Study of the Google 
Books Projects Case in China and the United States, 63 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 
573 (2016).  
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Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have consid-
ered, or are considering, adopting elements of fair use in those juris-
dictions as well.18  
Yet, ironically, U.S. copyright industries – motion picture 
studios, record labels, music publishers, and print publishers -- and, 
in some instances, U.S. government representatives have steadfastly 
opposed the transplanting of U.S. fair use to other countries. U.S. 
copyright industries have repeatedly lobbied other countries not to 
adopt the U.S. fair use privilege. Further, the Intellectual Property 
Alliance (“IIPA”), a leading copyright industry trade association, 
has repeatedly cited countries’ “ill-advised” adoption of fair use in 
petitioning the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to exercise that 
agency’s statutory authority to threaten those countries with trade 
sanctions for inadequately protecting intellectual property rights.19 
In turn, the USTR and U.S. State Department have joined with the 
copyright industries to oppose adoption of fair use in other countries 
and in international copyright treaties, even though they have repeat-
edly promoted global enactment of other provisions of U.S. copy-
right law.20 They argue, principally, that, while fair use works 
                                                                                                             
18 AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N [ALRC], COPYRIGHT AND THE 
DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 123-60 (2013) (recommending the in-
troduction of a fair use exception); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE 
RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE EU 
COPYRIGHT RULES 33-36 (July 2014) (reporting on consultations regarding 
whether the E.U. should provide for greater flexibility for copyright exceptions 
and limitations, including in the form of a fair use provision); COPYRIGHT 
REVIEW COMM., MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 93-94 (2013) (Jr.) (recom-
mending the introduction of the fair use exception as a new Section 49A of the 
Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act); LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
AMENDMENTS TO BE MOVED BY THE HONOURABLE CHAN KAM-
LAM, SBS, JP 4 (2015) (Hong Kong), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/eng-
lish/counmtg/papers/cm20151209cb3-219-e.pdf (LC Paper No. CB(3) 219/15-
16) (providing the text of the fair use proposal presented for legislative debate in 
Hong Kong); HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3 Error! Bookmark not de-
fined. (United Kingdom); ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006) (United Kingdom); Tatsuhiro Ueno, Rethinking 
the Provisions on Limitations of Rights in the Japanese Copyright Act--Toward a 
Japanese-Style “Fair Use” Clause, 34 AIPPI J. 159 (2009) (Japan). The New 
Zealand government considered but rejected adopting fair use. See Lior Zemer, 
Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and the 
Case of Fair Use, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 1051, 1096 n. 271 (2011). 
19 See text accompanying notes _infra. 
20 See Yu, Customizing Fair Use, supra note 4, at 3-4, noting that the United States 
has pushed other countries to adopt broad protections for copyright holders found 
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reasonably well in the U.S., foreign courts that lack the 150 years of 
U.S. fair use precedent would be highly susceptible to applying the 
fair use exception in a chaotic, libertine manner, thus seriously un-
dermining copyright protection.  
This Article tests the credibility of that blanket U.S. opposi-
tion. In so doing, we present the first comprehensive study of how 
courts have actually applied fair use in a country outside the United 
States.21 We look to Israel as a case study to test the claims of oppo-
nents of adopting the fair use model outside the United States.  
Israel’s legislature, the “Knesset,” enacted fair use as part of 
that country’s general copyright law revision, codified in Israel’s 
Copyright Law 2007.22 Israel’s fair use provision, Section 19 of the 
Copyright Law 2007, is a close translation of Section 107 of the U.S. 
Copyright Act (with a couple key differences that we note below). 
Yet, like in other countries that have considered adopting fair use, 
U.S. copyright industries voiced the objection that transplanting fair 
use to Israel would severely undermine copyright owners’ rights.23 
We report below the results of our quantitative and qualita-
tive evaluation of the first decade of fair use case law in Israel. We 
also compare Israeli fair use doctrine with that of the United States, 
drawing on parallel empirical studies of U.S fair use case law. 
Our study has significance for the global fair use debate, 
even recognizing that Israel’s copyright law and legal system may 
well differ in important respects from those of other countries.24 As 
noted above, ours is the first comprehensive study of how courts 
                                                                                                             
in the U.S. Copyright Act, but has actively opposed the adoption fair use in do-
mestic legislation and treaties. 
21 See Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics – at Home and Abroad, in 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 234, 261 (Ruth L. 
Okediji, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN 
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS] (noting that “it is time to start monitoring 
[the jurisdictions that have adopted fair use] to see how the new provisions are 
being applied by the courts”). 
22 Israel Copyright Law, 5768-2007. Prior to enactment of that general copyright 
revision, which took effect on May 25, 2008, the Israel copyright law was the 
U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, as supplemented and amended by the U.K. Copy-
right Ordinance of 1924.  
23  See notes – infra and accompanying text. 
24 Given that Israel’s legal system is a common law system, our study does not 
address the claim that fair use, as a creature of the common law, has no place in 
civil law systems. For an illuminating critique of that claim, see Martin 
Senftleben, The Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Pro-
visions, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231 (2017). 
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outside the United States have applied fair use. In addition, Israel’s 
adoption of fair use has been repeatedly cited in deliberations in 
other countries that are considering whether to follow suit.25 Israel’s 
experience with fair use might be viewed with particular interest in 
other countries given Israel’s prominence as a knowledge-based 
economy, sometimes called start-up nation,26 where the high-tech 
industry and technological innovation are important drivers of eco-
nomic growth. Fair use proponents argue that in such an environ-
ment, which relies on frequent technological advances, the 
flexibility offered by fair use is likely to be essential.27  
Our study plausibly supports two general conclusions of rel-
evance to the global debate about fair use.28 First, our findings coun-
ter the sweeping claim, repeatedly advanced by U.S. copyright 
industries and other fair use opponents, that the adoption of fair use 
outside the United States will inevitably open the floodgates to mas-
sive uncompensated copying and dissemination of authors’ creative 
expression. As we discuss, far from seeing fair use as a “free ticket 
to copy,” Israeli courts actually ruled against fair use at a far greater 
rate than did their American counterparts during the ten-year period 
of our study.  
Of course, whatever has been Israel’s experience, courts in 
Liberia, Ecuador, or another country might still interpret fair use in 
some manner that U.S. copyright industries regard as anathema.  But 
Israeli case law following Israel’s enactment of fair use demon-
strates that the mere fact that judges outside the United States lack 
the experience of U.S. judges in applying fair use and the guidance 
of decades of U.S. fair use precedent does not necessarily lead to a 
chaotic or wide open interpretation of fair use. Indeed, the Israel ex-
perience thus far raises the distinct possibility that courts in other 
countries might apply the user privilege more narrowly than do their 
U.S. counterparts. At the very least, U.S. opposition to transplanting 
                                                                                                             
25 See, e.g., Australian Government Productivity Commission, Intellectual Prop-
erty Arrangements; Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 78 (September 
23, 2016) at p. 9. HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, 5.18, at 45 (U.K.). 
26 DAN SENOR AND SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF ISRAEL’S 
ECONOMIC MIRACLE (2009). . 
27 See, e.g., Letter of Google Australia, dated July 4, 2018, to Australia’s Depart-
ment of Communications and the Arts, as part of the Department’s Copyright Law 
Modernization consultation. 
28 We take no position on claims of U.S. technology companies and other fair use 
proponents that fair use is highly conducive to technological innovation. Such 
claims are beyond the scope of our study of case law. 
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fair use should be assessed against additional case studies of how 
fair use has actually been applied in other countries. Certainly, the 
USTR should give no weight to the mere fact that a country has 
adopted fair use in determining whether that country adequately pro-
tects intellectual property rights within the meaning of U.S. trade 
law.  
Second, our case study suggests that in one respect U.S. cop-
yright industries raise a valid point: local courts will, indeed, de-
velop distinct versions of fair use doctrine in line with their local 
jurisprudence and national policies. The courts might cite leading 
U.S. fair use cases. However, they are unlikely to coalesce around a 
single, uniform, America-led version of fair use. Indeed, courts may 
well develop distinct local variants of fair use even in countries, like 
Israel, where the legislature enacts a fair use provision that closely 
tracks the language of Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.  
Israel’s experience should be no surprise. Local variation is 
what the scholarly literature on legal transplants tells us to expect.  
Courts in countries that purport to transplant statutory regimes from 
elsewhere generally come to interpret – and effectively alter -- the 
transplanted foreign law in line with local conditions, legal tradi-
tions, and jurisprudence.29 Israel’s adoption of fair use, in near literal 
translation of the American statute, is a prime example of that phe-
nomenon. As interpreted by Israeli courts, fair use looks quite dif-
ferent from the doctrine that courts have developed in the United 
States. Such local variation does not mean, however, that transplant-
ing fair use will inevitably lead to massive uncompensated copying. 
That clearly has not been the case in Israel. 
                                                                                                             
29 See Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlim-
ited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1427 
(2010); Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 16-22 (Su-
jit Choudhry ed., 2006); Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal 
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization 
Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT. L. J. 1 (2004). As Peter Yu has illu-
minated with respect to fair use, countries might also enact an altered version of 
a foreign statute to begin with, as the legislature seeks to tailor the foreign trans-
plant to local law, policy, and perceived needs. See Yu, Customizing Transplants, 
supra note 4; Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 16. Michael Birnhack 
presents a cogent argument that courts should avoid reflexive transplantation of 
foreign doctrine and should, instead, adapt foreign doctrine to local needs by un-
derstanding the doctrines theoretical underpinnings. See Michael Birnhack, Judi-
cial Snapshots and Fair Use Theory, 5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 264 
(2015). 
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Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we briefly ex-
plicate U.S. fair use doctrine and further contrast it with copyright 
laws that provide a closed list of exceptions. In Part II, we document 
repeated U.S. government and copyright industry opposition to fair 
use in other countries and in international fora. In Part III, we chron-
icle Israel’s adoption of fair use and the U.S. copyright industry op-
position to enacting fair use in Israel. Part IV presents our 
comparative study of Israeli and U.S. fair use case law during the 
decade following the effective date of the Copyright Law 2007 and 
in light of a more recent, landmark ruling of the Israeli Supreme 
Court.30 In Part V, we conclude.  
 
I. FAIR USE VERSUS CLOSED LISTS OF COPYRIGHT 
EXCEPTIONS 
The open-ended, flexible character of U.S. fair use doctrine 
presents a sharp contrast to the closed catalogue regimes in both civil 
law countries and many countries that have adopted the British fair 
dealing exception. At the same time, the differences between the two 
regimes are not as wide as might appear. Fair use is more consistent 
and predictable than critics charge, and courts in closed catalogue 
regimes have carved out a degree of flexibility in the face of the 
regimes’ generally restrictive character. This Part fleshes out the 
fundamental contrast between fair use and closed catalogue regimes, 
but also notes the ways in which courts have mitigated some of the 
sharp differences. We also explicate central elements of U.S. fair 
use doctrine to provide background for our comparative study of 
U.S. and Israeli fair use. 
A. Fair Use 
 
Fair use is a creature of judge-made Anglo-American com-
mon law. The doctrine is widely said to have sprung from Justice 
Story’s test for “a fair and bona fide abridgement,” set out in his 
1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh. Yet, fair use has even earlier 
roots. One can trace its origins to fair abridgement cases litigated in 
English courts of law and equity extending back to 1710.31  
                                                                                                             
30 C..A. 3425/17 Nestlé  Societe Des Produits S.A v Espresso Club Ltd (August 
7, 2019). 
31 See Matthew Sag, The Pre-History of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371 
(2011).  
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When Congress codified fair use in Section 107 of the Cop-
yright Act of 1976, it maintained the doctrine’s judge-made charac-
ter. Section 107 provides that courts are to determine whether a 
defendant’s use qualifies as fair use on a case-by-case basis, using 
as guidelines four statutory factors gleaned from prior case law. The 
Court may also consider any other factor it deems relevant.  The four 
statutory factors are: 
“(1) the purpose and character of the use, includ-
ing whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.” 
 
Importantly, the fair use claimant need not satisfy each factor 
in order for the use to qualify as fair use. Nor are the four factors 
meant to set out some kind of mathematical equation whereby, if at 
least three factors favor or disfavor fair use, that determines the re-
sult. Rather, the factors serve as guidelines for holistic, case-by-case 
decision. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “All [factors] are to 
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the pur-
poses of copyright.”32  
In that vein, in its preamble paragraph, Section 107 provides 
a list of several examples of the types of uses that can qualify as fair 
use. The examples, which include “criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, [and] research,” are often thought to be favored uses for 
qualifying for fair use. Importantly, however, the list of favored uses 
is not dispositive. Rather, fair use’s open-ended framework imposes 
no limits on the types of uses that courts may determine are “fair.”33 
                                                                                                             
32 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
33 As the Supreme Court has stated: “The text employs the terms ‘including’ and 
‘such as’ in the preamble paragraph to indicate the “illustrative and not limitative” 
function of the examples given, which thus provide only general guidance about 
the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair 
uses.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 577-78 (1994) (citations 
omitted). 
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As iterated in the House Report to the Copyright Act of 1976, Sec-
tion 107 was meant to give courts considerable leeway in adapting 
fair use doctrine to new circumstances and technologies: 
 
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no dispo-
sition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially 
during a period of rapid technological change. Be-
yond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair 
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the 
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular 
situations on a case-by-case basis.34 
 
Fair use jurisprudence since 1976 is very much in line with 
that Congressional intent. In interpreting and applying Section 107, 
U.S. courts have repeatedly exercised the flexibility accorded to 
them to determine the types of uses that may qualify as “fair.” No-
tably, these include new uses made possible by digital technology 
that Congress could not have contemplated in 1976 and thus that do 
not appear among examples of uses enumerated in Section 107. 
Courts have made clear, for example, that user-posted remixes on 
social media, digital sampling of recorded music, displaying copy-
righted material in search engine results, and mass digitization of 
books and other works may all qualify as fair use, depending on the 
particular facts of each case.35  U.S. courts have also recognized fair 
use not only in traditional fair use categories like scholarship, news 
                                                                                                             
34 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). See also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, 
Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 875-77 (1987) 
(summarizing the House Hearings on Fair Use).  
35 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (image 
search engine results); Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (fair use defense may be available for digital sampling of sound record-
ing even if de minimis copying defense is not); Estate of Barre v. Carter, 272 
F.Supp.3d 906, 930 (E.D. Louisiana 2017) (holding that digital sampling may 
qualify as fair use but that fair use defense was not sufficient to support a motion 
to dismiss under the facts as alleged in the complaint); Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (sender of DMCA notice to take down user-
posted video featuring copyrighted music must consider fair use); Authors Guild 
v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 2015) (mass digitization and search engine 
results).  
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reporting, and parody, but also in using existing works as raw mate-
rial for new expressive purposes and aesthetics.36  
Fair use’s flexible, open-ended character has led some crit-
ics, both within the U.S. and without, to charge that the doctrine is 
arbitrary, ad hoc, and unpredictable.37 Yet empirical studies of fair 
use case law have cast considerable doubt on that claim. Contrary to 
the charge that fair use is wholly unpredictable, the empirical studies 
uncover considerable order and consistency in fair use case law. For 
example, Barton Beebe’s quantitative, empirical study and regres-
sion analysis illuminates which factors and sub-factors exert the 
most influence on fair use case law.38 Likewise, Pamela Samuelson 
finds consistency in fair use precedent by creating a taxonomy of 
uses.39 She discovers greater predictability of results when we ex-
amine like cases based on the type of use than when we look at fair 
use case law as a whole. Further, Matthew Sag presents a regression 
analysis finding statistically significant correlations between case 
outcomes and combinations of various factual variables, such as the 
legal identify of the parties and whether the defendant used the 
plaintiff’s work as part of a commercial product or service.40  
In addition, one of us, Neil Netanel, has shown that identify-
ing historical trends in fair use case law makes further sense of fair 
use.41 The Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.42 initiated a dramatic shift in fair use doctrine, a shift 
that took several years fully to take hold.  In fundamental ways, fair 
use is a different doctrine today than it was twenty or thirty years 
ago. So if we compare fair use cases from the 1980s to present-day 
cases, it is no wonder that fair use might look like a chaotic mix of 
                                                                                                             
36 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609-
10 (2nd Cir. 2006) (use of concert poster art to illustrate a biography of rock band); 
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706-07 (2nd Cir. 2013)(use of photographs in art 
work); A.V. ex. rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(student papers copied for plagiarism detection service). 
37 See Neil W. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
715,716-17  (2011) (quoting critics). 
38 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008). 
39 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
40 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47 (2012). See also Michael 
J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1525 (2004) (presenting a more theoretical, but also illuminating systematization 
of fair use doctrine). 
41 Netanel, supra note 37. 
42 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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ad hoc, contradictory decisions. By contrast, if we compare only 
cases decided over the past fifteen years or so, we find far greater 
consistency. In particular, the issue that overwhelmingly dominates 
fair use analysis today is whether and to what extent the defendant’s 
use is “transformative,” a term that Campbell introduced to fair use 
case law. But prior to the doctrinal shift initiated by Campbell, the 
dominant questions in fair use analysis were, instead, whether the 
defendant’s use was “commercial” and whether the use harmed the 
potential market for the plaintiff’s work.43 
Jiarui Liu’s empirical research also highlights the emerging 
dominance and far-reaching impact of the transformative use ap-
proach to fair use in the United States. In his comprehensive study 
of fair use rulings from January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the 
Copyright Act of 1976) to January 1, 2017, Liu found that, in the 
decade preceding 2017, close to 90% of fair use cases considered 
whether the defendant’s use is “transformative.”44 Moreover, if a 
U.S. court finds the defendant’s use to be “transformative,” it will 
almost inevitably rule that the use is a fair use (unless the court char-
acterizes the use as only “somewhat” or “minimally” transforma-
tive). Liu found that in 94% of cases in which the court found the 
use to be transformative, the court went on to hold that the use was 
fair use. By contrast, the same lopsided percentage, 94%, of non-
transformative uses were held not to be fair use.45  
The definition of what uses qualify as transformative is thus 
obviously key to unpacking fair use doctrine. In that regard, first and 
foremost, a use is “transformative” if the alleged copyright infringer 
has used the copyrighted work for a fundamentally different expres-
sive purpose from that of the work’s author. Copying a work for 
purposes of parody or criticism of the original work would be a par-
adigmatic transformative use.  
Importantly, a use for a fundamentally different expressive 
purpose may qualify as transformative even if the alleged infringer 
                                                                                                             
43 See Netanel, supra note 37, at 734-46. 
44 Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163, 166, 175 (2019). 
45 See id., at 167, 180. A more recently published quantitative empirical study of 
all district court and appellate court fair use opinions between 1991 and 2017 sim-
ilarly concludes that fair use outcomes correlate overwhelmingly with whether 
the court finds that the defendant’s use is transformative, but also notes that only 
about half of defendants win the transformative use inquiry. See Clark D. Asay, 
Arielle Sloan, and Dean Sobczak, Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 
B.C. L. REV. 905 (2020). 
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copies the work in its entirety without altering it.46 Google’s digiti-
zation of books was held to be “highly transformative” because 
Google copied them and displayed short snippets of text relevant to 
search queries for the “purpose of enabling a search for identifica-
tion of books containing a term of interest to the searcher,” not to 
enable the public to read the books.47 The publisher of an illustrated 
history of the Grateful Dead made a transformative use of images of 
Grateful Dead concert posters that it featured in the book because 
the original posters served the purposes of concert promotion and 
artistic expression, while the defendant copied them as “artifacts to 
document and represent” historical events.48  
More controversially, some courts have held that copying for 
the same general expressive purpose, while using the original as raw 
material for a “drastically different … aesthetic,” may also qualify 
as a transformative use.49 For example, the Second Circuit held that 
the artist, Prince, made fair use of black-and-white photographs that 
depicted the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their Jamaican sur-
roundings. Key for the court was that Prince had incorporated the 
photographs into hectic and provocative artworks that manifested an 
entirely distinct aesthetic, with fundamental differences in composi-
tion, presentation, scale, color palette and media.50  A user remix 
encompassing bits of popular movies and music recordings thus 
                                                                                                             
46 See Liu, supra note 44, at 170 (finding that of the decisions finding different 
expressive purpose, but no physical modification of the original work, 60.7% 
found the use to be transformative). 
47 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216-18 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
48 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609-10 (2nd 
Cir. 2006). 
49  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706-07 (2nd Cir. 2013). In his comprehensive 
study of transformative use case law, Liu compares fair use outcomes for cases 
involving transformative purpose but no physical transformation with those in 
which the defendant physically modified the copyrighted work but did so with the 
same expressive purpose as original author.  Liu finds that courts ruled in favor 
of fair use in 60.7% of the cases involving transformative purpose but no physical 
transformation, but in favor of fair use in just 32.7% of the cases involving phys-
ical transformation but no transformative purpose. Liu, supra note 44, at 205. 
50 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706-07 (2nd Cir. 2013). See also Seltzer v. Green 
Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1176-78 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding to be a transformative use 
a rock band's use of artist's illustration of screaming face in video backdrop of its 
stage show as raw material to convey a different expressive message and mean-
ing). 
16 DRAFT   2020 
might qualify as a transformative use on grounds of different expres-
sive purpose if it comments on the original or some social phenom-
enon or on grounds of drastically different aesthetic. 
Notably, as Liu’s findings indicate, while uses found to be 
transformative will almost always be held to be fair use, non-trans-
formative uses may also qualify, albeit in relatively few cases. Most 
famously, the Supreme Court held in Sony Corp. of America v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., that consumers’ analog recording of tele-
vision programs for later viewing is fair use.51 Lower courts have 
subsequently extended Sony to digital recordings of television pro-
grams and to reproducing a copy of a work that a consumer legally 
owns in order to transfer it from one consumer device to another.52  
Finally, of importance in comparing fair use to closed cata-
logue regimes, fair use is not the only exception to copyright holder 
rights in U.S. law. Rather, Section 107 stands alongside lengthy, de-
tailed provisions, Sections 108 to 122 of the Copyright Act that set 
out a long list of narrowly tailored exceptions and limitations for 
uses ranging from public performance of music in retail establish-
ments to making audio and braille copies for the visually impaired. 
In comparing the U.S. fair use model with closed catalog regimes, it 
is important to highlight that U.S. fair use operates independently 
from those narrowly tailored exceptions and limitations.53 No copy-
right holder authorization is required for uses that meet the require-
ments of one of the specific exceptions or limitations, regardless of 
whether the use might or might not qualify as fair use. And, unlike 
close catalog copyright systems, a use that qualifies as fair use is 
noninfringing even if it does not fall within any of the specific ex-
ceptions and limitations. 
                                                                                                             
51 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Recently, the Second Circuit has sought  to recast Sony as 
a transformative use case. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 
661 (2nd Cir. 2018), quoting Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 
169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018) (“In Sony, the ‘apparent reasoning was that a secondary 
use may be a fair use if it utilizes technology to achieve the transformative purpose 
of improving the efficiency of delivering content without unreasonably encroach-
ing on the commercial entitlements of the rights holder’”….) 
52 See, e.g, Fox Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d 1060, 
1068-70 (9th Cir. 2014). 
53 See Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and Excep-
tions, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra 
note 21, at 12 (discussing policy justifications for and interplay between fair use 
and enumerated exceptions and limitations in U.S. copyright law). 
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B. Closed List Copyright Exceptions 
1. Civil Law Regimes 
 
Until the late 1990s, the United States was the only country 
in the world with an open-ended fair use privilege.  Copyright laws 
of continental European and other civil law countries typically set 
out a closed list of narrowly defined permitted uses. For example, 
Article L122-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code provides 
that once an author has disclosed his or her work to the public, the 
author may not prohibit (1) “private and gratuitous performances 
carried out exclusively within the family circle,” (2) “copies … 
made from a lawful source, and strictly for private use,” (3) “short 
quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific 
or information of the work to which they are incorporated,” “press 
reviews,” (4) “the dissemination … by the press or television, as 
current news … of speeches intended for the public made in politi-
cal, administrative, judicial, or academic proceedings,” (5) “parody, 
pastiche, and caricature,” (6) noncommercial reproductions made 
for purposes of conservation or preservation and accessible from 
within publicly accessible libraries, museums, or archives; and (7) a 
couple additional similarly narrow and expressly defined uses.54 
Similarly, the European Union’s Copyright in the Information Soci-
ety Directive of 2001 lists twenty specific exceptions and limitations 
that member states are entitled to enact.55 Pursuant to the Copyright 
in the Information Society Directive, EU country copyright statutes 
provide that copying or publicly communicating a copyright-pro-
tected work in a manner that the statute does not expressly identify 
as a copyright exception requires the copyright owner’s permission 
– and, absent permission, infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights.  
Further, courts may not fashion new exceptions, and the tra-
ditional rule in many countries, including those of the European Un-
ion, is that copyright limitations and exceptions must be narrowly 
construed.56 It does not matter how socially beneficially the use 
                                                                                                             
54 Code de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 1 juin 2019). 
55 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society [hereinafter EU Copyright Directive], Art. 5. 
56 But see Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can EU Author’s Rights Accommo-
date Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, 
18 DRAFT   2020 
might be or whether it is a type of use that the legislature did not and 
could not have contemplated when it enacted the relevant provision 
of the copyright statute. Consequently, Google’s scanning of mil-
lions of library books was held to be infringing under French copy-
right law. For that matter, Google’s library partners’ creation of a 
searchable database of those books would also infringe because 
France’s exception for copying by libraries and archives is limited 
to copying for purposes of preservation. By contrast, the Second Cir-
cuit held that the digital copying of library books by Google’s li-
brary partners to establish an online searchable database qualified as 
fair use, just as a different Second Circuit panel held that Google 
itself had made fair use of the books that it digitized.57  
Of note, some closed catalog regimes also include an open-
ended standard like fair use. The EU Copyright in the Information 
Society Directive, for example, incorporates the three-step test that 
has become standard in intellectual property treaties, including the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. However, the three-step 
test operates to impose a restriction on the specific exceptions and 
limitations set out in the Directive, not as an open-ended, flexible 
exception like fair use. Article 5(5) of the Directive provides that the 
specific exceptions and limitations “shall only be applied in [1] cer-
tain special cases which [2] do not conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the work or other subject-matter and [3] do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”58 Unlike fair 
use, the Copyright Directive’s three-step test is not a freestanding 
exception that may be applied even if the use falls outside the spe-
cific exceptions or limitations. Nor are the specific exceptions and 
limitations independent from the three-step test. Per Article 5(5), a 
specific exception or limitation may only be applied in a particular 
case if doing so would comport with the three-step test.59 
                                                                                                             
supra note 21, at 275, 284-85 (discussing the three-step test constraint and tradi-
tional rule of narrow construction but noting that recent decisions of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union “reflect a more liberal manner of interpreting lim-
itations and exceptions,” even while “still providing lip service to the rule of nar-
row construction”).   
57 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 2014). 
58 EU Copyright Directive, supra note 55, Art. 5(5). 
59 Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, CJEU , Case C-476/17, Paragraph 62 (2019). 
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2. Fair Dealing Regimes 
 
The United Kingdom and former British colonies and do-
minions that followed its example provide for a “fair dealing” ex-
ception to copyright. Fair dealing differs in some respects from the 
civil law approach to copyright exceptions. But, today, fair dealing 
is also typically understood to permit only a closed list of excep-
tions.60 
Until 1911, United Kingdom fair dealing doctrine was much 
like American fair use.61 Courts had wide latitude to determine fair-
ness, unconstrained by any statutorily mandated closed list.62 As 
such, UK courts permitted fair abridgement as needed to prevent 
copyright from putting “manacles upon science.”63 However, in 
1911 Parliament codified fair dealing case law in a provision that 
courts have interpreted to enumerate a closed list of uses to which 
the exception could apply. The U.K. Copyright Law of 1911 pro-
vided that “any fair dealing with any work for the purpose of private 
study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary” did not 
constitute copyright infringement.64 Former British colonies and do-
minions such as Australia,65 Canada,66 India,67 New Zealand,68 and 
                                                                                                             
60 Singapore and Sri Lanka, two British Commonwealth countries that each re-
cently enacted an open-ended exception modelled on fair use, are exceptions to 
that general rule. They continue to denominate the exception as “fair dealing” 
rather than adopting the “fair use” appellation. 
61 See Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright 
Dominion and the Case of Fair Use, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 1051, 1074 (2011).   
62 See, e.g., Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 17 Vesey 422 (Eng.) (holding that “a legiti-
mate use of a publication in the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the 
character of an original work” does not infringe copyright); Smith v. Chato, 
(1874) 31 L.T. 77 (Eng.). 
63 Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (Eng.). 
64 Copyright Act 1911, §2(1)(i) (U.K.). As Ariel Katz has cogently argued, it is 
far from clear that Parliament intended to set out a closed list rather than a list of 
illustrative examples. But courts in the U.K. and other countries have generally, 
albeit perhaps not decisively, interpreted the 1911 fair dealing exception to set out 
a closed list. See Ariel Katz, Debunking the Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing Myth: Have 
We had Fair Use All Along?, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Shyam Balganesh, Wee Loon Ng-Loy, and 
Haochen Sun, eds, Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2020). 
65 See Copyright Act 1968, pt. III, div. 3 (cth) (Austl.). 
66 See Copyright Act R.S. 1921, § 29 (Can.). 
67 See The Copyright Act, No. 49 of 1999, [India Code] ch. XI (1957), Vol. 14 
(Ind.). 
68 See Copyright Act 1994, §§ 42-43 (N.Z.). 
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South Africa69 enacted similar closed-list versions of fair dealing. 
Likewise, of particular relevance to our study, the U.K. Copyright 
Law of 1911, including the closed-list fair dealing exception, took 
effect in British Mandate Palestine following World War I and was 
incorporated into Israeli law upon the establishment of the State of 
Israel in 1948.70  
Courts in the UK and elsewhere have applied various judge-
made factors to determine whether a use meets the test of “fairness.” 
But with the notable recent exception of Canada’s Supreme Court, 
they have held that even if the test of fairness is met, fair dealing 
cannot apply to types of uses that are not listed in the statute.71 Ra-
ther, like the European Copyright Directive’s rule regarding the 
three-step test, “fairness” operates only as a constraint on applying 
the exception to listed uses in particular cases. Even if a particular 
use falls within one of enumerated purposes, it will not qualify as 
“fair dealing” unless it would be “fair” to exempt the use from cop-
yright holder authorization under the circumstances. The United 
Kingdom’s current fair dealing provisions, as set out in the Copy-
right, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, similarly enumerate a closed 
list of exceptions to copyright, in line with the European Union Cop-
yright Directive.72 
 
C. Some Perspective on the Differences 
 
The fair use and closed catalog models differ substantially in 
their basic approach to carving out exceptions to copyright owner 
rights. However, the differences are not quite as stark as might ap-
pear.  
From the fair use side, as the empirical studies have shown, 
U.S. fair use does not truly operate as a fully open-ended, standard-
based regime in the sense that courts exercise virtually unbridled 
discretion to weigh the equities in each individual case. Rather, U.S. 
courts tend to coalesce around more precise rules for standard fact 
                                                                                                             
69 See Copyright Act 98 of 1978, § 12 (S. Afr.). 
70 See MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN MANDATE PALESTINE (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
71 See LIONEL BENTLY AND BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 193 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 2004) (under UK fair dealing doctrine the dealing 
must be fair for the one or more of the purposes set out in the closed list). 
72 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, c. 48, §§ 29-31 (Eng.). 
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patterns. For example, copying for purpose of parody, criticism of 
the copied work, introduction of the work in evidence in litigation 
(unless the copied work was initially created for possible use in liti-
gation), and comparative advertising almost always qualifies as fair 
use.73 As such, fair use’s flexibility lies in enabling courts effec-
tively to tailor fair use for new uses, fact patterns, and policy 
choices. 
For their part, closed catalog regimes provide somewhat 
greater flexibility than is often assumed. First, close catalog regimes 
operate within a system of constitutional and general private law that 
sometimes provides courts with openings to find flexibilities outside 
the copyright statute. For example, European courts have occasion-
ally looked to the right to free expression grounded in a national 
constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights to inter-
pret a copyright exception broadly or even to override the rules of 
copyright.74 Likewise, in the Google Thumbnails case, the German 
Federal Supreme Court ruled that even though Google’s display of 
images through its image search engine did not fall within any cop-
yright exception, Google’s use of the images was lawful under the 
doctrine of implied consent.75 The Court reasoned that the copyright 
owner had implicitly consented to the use of her images in the image 
                                                                                                             
73 See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 39, at 2550-53 (parody and criticism), 2592-
93 (litigation), 2597-99 (comparative advertising)(2009). See also Niva Elkin-
Koren and Orit Fishman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZONA L. REV. 161, 163 
(2017); Justin Hughes, The Sub Rosa Rules of Copyright Fair Use, 34 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2020) (characterizing fair use as a mechanism for courts 
to create specific exceptions that are akin to rules). For a seminal discussion of 
the dynamic standards-rules continuum in property law generally, see Carol M. 
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1998). 
74 See, e.g., Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-
469/17, Court of Justice of the E.U. (29 July 2019) (stating that freedom of ex-
pression does not justify a copyright exception beyond those specified in the EU 
Copyright Directive, but that the right to free expression may inform interpreta-
tion of a specified exception). See also Bernt Hugenholtz and Martin R. F. 
Seftleben, Fair Use in Europe. In Search of Flexibilities, Institute for Information 
Law, University of Amsterdam, November 2011, at 11 (discussing the Germania 
3 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the Scientology v. 
XS4ALL ruling of the Court of Appeal of the Hague, both of which permitted 
extensive quotations from copyright-protected works. See also Christophe Geiger 
and Elena Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use” Grounded in Freedom of 
Expression, Center for International Intellectual Property Studies Research Paper 
No. 2019-02 (2019). 
75 Bundesgerichtshof, April 29, 2010, case I ZR 69/08, p. 14-15, summarized in 
Hugenholtz & Senftleben, id., at 12. 
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search service by making her images available online without em-
ploying readily available technical means to block search engine’s 
indexing and display of the images.   
Second, a degree of flexibility can be obtained through nar-
rowly defining the scope of authors’ exclusive rights, in particular 
the right of adaptation (the equivalent of the right to prepare deriva-
tive works under U.S. copyright law). As Hugenholtz and Seftleben 
point out, both Germany and the Netherlands allow a degree of free-
dom to adapt another’s work when the adaptation is sufficiently dis-
tinct from the underlying work.76 The relative freedom to adapt is 
not defined as an exception to copyright holder rights. Rather Ger-
man and Dutch courts narrowly construe the copyright holders’ ex-
clusive right to adapt their work such that it does not extend to 
adaptations that are sufficiently distinct. But the effect is similar. 
German and Dutch law could conceivably give free rein to many 
uses that would qualify as transformative uses under U.S. fair use 
law.  
That said, the fair use model still provides courts greater 
flexibility to devise a copyright exception for new technological 
uses, such as in the Google Book Search case, as well as to permit 
exact copying for a different expressive purpose, as in the Illustrated 
History of the Grateful Dead case.  For that reason, several leading 
European scholars have advocated adoption of fair use, or an open-
ended exception based on the three-step test, under European law.77 
 
II. U.S. AND COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY OPPOSITION 
Motion picture studios, book publishers, and record labels have 
all asserted the fair use defense in copyright infringement lawsuits 
brought against them.78 Nonetheless, copyright industry trade asso-
ciations and lobbyists have resolutely opposed the adoption of fair 
use outside the United States.  
                                                                                                             
76 Id. at 25-26. 
77 See, e.g., See, e.g., Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece - the Liber-
ation of European Copyright Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. 
COMM. L. 87, 90-91 (2010); Senftleben, supra note 26; Alexandra Sims, The 
Case for Fair Use in New Zealand, 24 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 176 (2016). 
78 See, e.g., May v. Sony Music Entertainment, 399 F.Supp.3d 169, 187-92 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2019)(denying recording industry and other defendants’ motion to dismiss 
based on fair use defense); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film  Corp., 602 
F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D. N.Y. 2009)(holding that song that Fox broadcasted in epi-
sode of Family Guy was fair use parody); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 
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An early example involved the negotiations leading up to the 
landmark Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPS”), adopted as part of the agreement establishing 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1994. TRIPs requires 
WTO member countries to comply with prescribed standards for in-
tellectual property protection and authorizes the imposition of trade 
sanctions against countries that fail to do so. In its initial submission 
to the TRIPS negotiations, the United States delegation, working 
closely with copyright industry associations, proposed that TRIPS 
allow countries to provide for exceptions to copyright holders’ ex-
clusive rights only in “clearly and carefully defined special cases 
which do not impair an actual or potential market for or the value of 
a protected work.”79 If the U.S. proposal had been adopted, TRIPS 
would have imposed a significant barrier to the adoption of fair use 
in other countries. Under that proposal, indeed, Section 107 of the 
U.S. Copyright Act, might have itself run afoul of U.S. obligations 
under TRIPS.  
The U.S. proposal was profoundly antagonistic to fair use in two 
respects. First, the proposal would have limited copyright excep-
tions to “clearly and carefully defined special cases.” That language 
suggests that only specific, narrow statutory exceptions are permit-
ted, or, at the very least, that judicial applications of an open-ended 
exception would be vulnerable to the claim that the court failed suf-
ficiently to define and delimit the special case held to enjoy the fair 
use privilege.  
Second, the U.S. proposal would narrowed the permissible 
scope of copyright exceptions to those that satisfy the fourth fair use 
factor: “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.” The proposal would have made the ab-
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lectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 
(2014); Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, 
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sence of market harm a threshold requirement for uses to be permit-
ted, not just one factor for courts to weigh in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether a defendant’s use qualifies as fair use. 
Granted, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the leading Supreme 
Court ruling on fair use when the U.S. submitted its TRIPS proposal, 
had characterized the fourth factor as the most single important fac-
tor for courts to consider. But even Harper & Row had not held up 
the fourth factor as a threshold requirement. Moreover, in its 1994 
ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court reiterated that 
all four factors must be considered, and put considerable, if not pri-
mary, weight on the first factor, in particular on whether the defend-
ant’s use is transformative.  
Ultimately, the U.S. proposal was rejected. Instead, TRIPS in-
corporates the three step test that has now become a standard provi-
sion in multilateral intellectual property law treaties as well as in 
national and regional legislation such as the EU Copyright in the 
Information Society Directive. TRIPS Article 13 provides that WTO 
member states “shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive 
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the le-
gitimate interests of the right holder.”   
Some commentators have argued that the U.S. fair use privilege 
might exceed the permissible scope of copyright exceptions under 
the TRIPS Article 13 three-step test. They advance a number of ar-
guments, principally that fair use’s open-ended, flexible character – 
the fact that fair use enables courts to hold that new uses, involving 
new technologies, not specified in the statute do not infringe copy-
right -- violates Article 13’s requirement that copyright exceptions 
may be available only in “certain special cases.”80 In particular, they 
                                                                                                             
80 See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATION AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 
162-165 (Kluwer Law International 2004)(summarizing the views of European 
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2002) § 5.5 at 284; Herman Cohen Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and Their 
Abuse, 27 E.I.P.R. 359, 362 (2005); Andre Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpreta-
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117 (2000); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 482 (Kluwer 1987).  Okediji, 
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does comport with the three-step test. See Mihaly J. Ficsor, Conflict of the Cana-
dian Legislation and Case Law on Fair Dealing for Educational Purposes with the 
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argue that the “certain special cases” restriction implies that a copy-
right exception must be legislatively confined to a narrow and spe-
cific purpose, much like the United States’ rejected TRIPS proposal 
would have explicitly required.81 Other commentators contest that 
proposition. They view Article 13 as more open-ended and flexi-
ble.82 Or they contend that fair use as actually applied by U.S. courts 
meets the three-step test and that actual application is what mat-
ters.83  
During a review of nations’ copyright laws undertaken by the 
TRIPS Council in 1996, the European Communities asked the 
United States to “explain how the fair use doctrine, as it has been 
broadly applied and interpreted by US courts, particularly in con-
nection with a ‘parody’ that diminishes the value of a work, is con-
sistent with TRIPS Article 13.”84 The United States responded that 
“[t]he fair use doctrine of US copyright law embodies essentially the 
same goals as Article 13 of TRIPS, and is applied and interpreted in 
a way entirely congruent with the standards set forth in that Arti-
cle.”85 In its response, the United States further emphasized that fair 
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82 See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais, Martin Senftleben, The Three-
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29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581, 612-616 (2014); Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra 
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83 See, e.g., Samuelson and Hashimoto, supra note 80, at xx. 
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Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights: United States, WTO Doc. 
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use is bounded by case law. The response cites the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Harper & Row that the fourth factor is the most im-
portant. The U.S. response further declares that “[i]n applying the 
fair use doctrine, the courts have consistently refused to excuse uses 
that go too far and interfere with the copyright owner’s normal mar-
kets for the work.”86  
In opposing adoption of fair use outside the United States, U.S. 
copyright industries similarly take the position that U.S. courts have, 
in fact, interpreted and applied Section 107 in a manner that gener-
ally comports with the three-step test. In so doing, they downplay 
the breadth, flexibility, and importance of fair use in the United 
States. In their telling, U.S. fair use comports with the three-step test 
only because U.S. courts have narrowly interpreted the exception. 
And they argue that, unmoored from restrictive and precise U.S. 
precedent, courts in other countries might well interpret fair use in 
an overly capacious, liberal manner that would exceed the strictures 
of the three-step test.  
We can see a prime example in the 2011 U.S. copyright industry 
submissions to the UK’s state-commissioned Hargreaves Review of 
Intellectual Property and Growth, which had solicited views on 
whether the UK should adopt fair use and on whether fair use spurs 
technological innovation and growth.87 In its submission, the Direc-
tors Guild of America (“DGA”) stated that “the fair use doctrine 
provides only a narrow affirmative defense to copyright infringe-
ment, and applies most frequently to small samples of creative work 
used for commentary, education, and parody.”88 The DGA further 
stated: “The fair use doctrine does not explicitly account for techno-
logical innovation, and the purpose of the fair use doctrine is not to 
promote any particular type of technological innovation.”89 Simi-
larly, the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) in-
formed the Hargreaves Review that because the U.S. Copyright Act 
contains 15 specific and narrow exceptions to copyright in addition 
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to fair use, “this ostensibly ‘flexible’ system is actually a fact-inten-
sive, detailed code.”90 The MPAA further cited U.S. Copyright Of-
fice advice that because the fair use defense is uncertain, “[t]he 
safest course is always to get permission from the copyright owner 
before using copyrighted material.”91  
Of note, in these 2011 submissions, the copyright industries as-
siduously ignored U.S. court rulings that had already taken a con-
siderably more expansive view of fair use. Most prominently, in its 
1984 ruling in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the 
Supreme Court held that consumer recording of television programs 
for later viewing is fair use and that, given that substantial nonin-
fringing use, the supplier of consumer video-recording equipment 
faces no liability for fostering copyright infringement.92 In so hold-
ing, the Court reiterated that “[t]he sole interest of the United States 
and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly… lie 
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of au-
thors.”93 Thus, the Court continued, “[w]hen technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be 
construed in light of this basic purpose.”94  
Subsequently, in 2007, the Ninth Circuit held that Google’s dis-
play of thumbnails of copyrighted images on its image search engine 
is fair use.95 In so holding, the Court gave considerable weight to the 
fact that “search engines such as Google Image Search provide great 
value to the public.” It reasoned that fair use must be interpreted in 
line with the Supreme Court’s statement in Sony that “[t]he purpose 
of copyright law is ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,’ and to serve “the welfare of the public.”96 And the Ninth Cir-
cuit further relied on Sony in noting “the importance of analyzing 
fair use flexibly in light of new circumstances.”97  
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As a final notable example, in 2006 the Second Circuit held that 
the market for transformative uses does not count for purposes of 
determining market harm under the fourth fair use factor.98  When 
the defendant’s “use of the copyrighted images is transformatively 
different from their original expressive purpose,” the Court stated, 
“a  copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use 
markets merely ‘by developing or licensing a market for parody, 
news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own 
creative work.’”99 
Since 2011, U.S. courts’ extension of fair use to new technolog-
ical uses and to uses held to be transformative has continued apace. 
The U.S. copyright industries, however, persist in holding up their 
imagined narrowly delimited portrait of fair use as the metric with 
which to measure whether fair use should be adopted in other coun-
tries.  They declare that they, of course, celebrate U.S. fair use. But 
they insist that to adopt fair use elsewhere raises “serious questions 
regarding consistency with the three-step test” because courts in 
other countries lack the “many decades of [U.S.] case law and prec-
edent” to insure that the fair use provision “is compliant with the 
three-step test.” Indeed, in the case of civil law countries, they fur-
ther argue, courts do “not follow the legal principle of stare decisis” 
and are not “bound by judicial precedent in the same way as com-
mon law countries.”100  
As such, the IIPA has repeatedly cited countries’ adoption of fair 
use in support of its petitions to the USTR for placing such countries 
on the watch list of countries that provide inadequate protection of 
U.S. intellectual property rights and thus should face the threat of 
trade sanctions.101  For example, the IIPA opposed Ecuador’s addi-
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tion of a fair use clause modeled on that of the United States. It ar-
gued that Ecuador’s adoption of fair use will “undermine copyright 
protection” given that Ecuador is a civil law system and Ecuadorian 
judges “have no experience or training on the doctrine of fair 
use.”102 Similarly, the IIPA has recently petitioned the USTR to 
deny South Africa developing country trade preferences due that 
country’s alleged failure to provide “’adequate and effective’ pro-
tection of American copyrighted works.”103 The IIPA petition points 
to South Africa’s “ill-considered importation of the U.S. ‘fair use’ 
rubric,” arguing that “South Africa lacks the decades of legal prec-
edent that have served to define, refine, and qualify the fair use doc-
trine in the United States.”104 The IIPA has also objected to the 
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adoption, or proposed adoption, of fair use in Canada,105 Japan,106 
South Korea,107 Chile,108 Taiwan,109 Sri Lanka,110 and, as we shall 
see, Israel on similar grounds. In a number of instances, the IIPA 
has insisted that countries that do adopt fair use must cabin the doc-
trine by providing explicitly in their copyright statute that fair use is 
subject to the three-step test.111  
U.S. copyright industries have likewise opposed the proposed 
introduction of fair use in Australia and the E.U. In Australia, a com-
mon law country, a number of government studies, conducted be-
tween 2006 and 2018, favored adopting fair use. The Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”) and the American Association 
of Publishers (“AAP”) repeatedly filed submissions opposing those 
proposals.  For example, in its 2012 submission to the Australian 
Law Reform Commission on Copyright and the Digital Economy, 
the MPAA stated: “The enactment as part of Australian law of a new 
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system based on the fair use doctrine would not bring with it this 
century and a half of judicial precedent [in the U.S.] that allows 
counsel, and the companies and individuals they advise, to rely upon 
the doctrine. Indeed, at its introduction, the new system would be 
unsupported by any binding precedent at all.”112 Likewise, the 
AAP’s 2016 response to the Australian Government Productivity 
Commission’s draft report advocating adoption of fair use highlights 
fair use’s case specific uncertainty: “[T]he radical uncertainty of the 
scope or applicability of the fair use exception to any particular set 
of facts can be a debilitating cost…. In the United States, these costs 
are mitigated, principally by the existence of a deep and rich body 
of case law and precedent …. While this system works well in the 
United States, AAP is skeptical whether it can be successfully trans-
planted to Australia.”113 
For its part, in 2013, the European Commission solicited public 
comments on whether the E.U. should provide for greater flexibility 
for copyright exceptions and limitations, including in the form of a 
fair use provision. The Motion Picture Association, Sony ATV Mu-
sic Publishing, and NBC Universal all responded by adamantly op-
posing adoption of fair use in the E.U.114 They insisted that absent 
U.S. case law’s many decades of judicial interpretation, transplant-
ing fair use to the E.U. “would be unwise and inevitably bring chaos 
to the system.”115  
Finally, at copyright industries’ urging, the United States op-
posed any reference to fair use in the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled. The Marrakesh Treaty, 
which was adopted in June 2013 and came into force in September 
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2016, requires signatory countries to provide copyright limitations 
or exceptions to facilitate the availability of copyrighted works in 
accessible format to blind, visually impaired and print disabled per-
sons (referred to in the Treaty as “beneficiary persons”).116 The 
Treaty further provides that signatory countries may fulfill their 
Treaty obligations through copyright limitations or exceptions that 
“may include judicial, administrative or regulatory determinations 
for the benefit of beneficiary persons as to fair practices, dealings or 
uses.”117 
While the draft Marrakesh Treaty was being negotiated, the Mo-
tion Picture Association sent U.S. negotiators a memorandum ob-
jecting that the draft treaty “expressly encouraged [signatory 
countries] to implement the proposed instrument by way of fair use 
or fair dealing, … without the need to pass by the three-step test in 
each and every case.”118 The Motion Picture Association memoran-
dum urged, accordingly, that “the proposed instrument should omit 
a reference to specific ways of implementation, in particular fair use 
and fair dealing, and subject all exceptions and limitations as a gen-
eral rule to the three-step test.”119 
A confidential U.S. State Department communication, subse-
quently obtained through a Freedom of Information Request, reveals 
that government officials sought to assuage copyright industry ob-
jections to the draft Treaty’s reference to fair use. The communica-
tion, dated April 3, 2013, states: “I know [redacted name of person] 
is interested in the reference to fair practices, uses and dealing on 
page 18 of the draft document. Quite frankly, we think that this ref-
erence could lead to overly broad exceptions and, in the interests of 
pragmatism, we think it would be best if we could drop this refer-
ence. I believe [redacted name of person] has lobbied you on this, 
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no? Basically we think that removing this fair practices reference 
will be a big help in getting consensus in the United States to nego-
tiate the final parameters of a binding agreement in Marrakesh.”120 
Ultimately, the reference to fair use remained in the Marrakesh 
Treaty. At U.S. insistence, an Article was added requiring that, in 
meeting their obligations under the Treaty, signatory countries must 
ensure that their limitations or exceptions for beneficiary persons 
comply with the three-step test set forth in TRIPS and other interna-
tional treaties.121  
In sum, U.S. copyright industries and, at certain junctures, U.S. 
government agencies have resolutely opposed the adoption of fair 
use in other countries.122 In so doing, they have assumed that, at the 
hands of foreign courts, unhinged from the “deep and rich body of 
[U.S.] case law and precedent,” fair use would likely be construed 
so broadly, arbitrarily, and inconsistently so as to bring massive le-
gal uncertainty and significant harm to copyright holders.  The U.S. 
copyright industry concern applies with special force to civil law 
countries, which the industries insist lack the tradition of adherence 
to precedent upon which common law fair use doctrine depends. But 
the industries voice their concern with respect to common law coun-
tries as well. The U.S. copyright industries insist, accordingly, that 
other countries should not replace narrowly defined, closed set lim-
itations with fair use. And if other countries must adopt fair use, their 
copyright statute must explicitly provide that fair use is subject to 
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never came into force. In another instance, the USTR pressured Hong Kong to 
adopt a fair use exception instead of a broader blanket exception for reverse engi-
neering of computer software. See Jonathan Band, The Global API Copyright 
Conflict, 31 HARV. J. L & TECH. 615, 621 (2018). 
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the three-step test, which the U.S. copyright industries interpret to 
impose significant, necessary constraints on judicial discretion.  
Commentators have presented convincing arguments challeng-
ing the U.S. copyright industry position. They question, first, 
whether, in the face of dramatic changes in technology, closed list 
copyright exception systems really yield more certain results than 
fair use.123  They also contest the notion that civil law judges are ill-
suited to developing a relatively stable and certain fair use doc-
trine.124 Finally, commentators contend that, as properly interpreted, 
the three-step test is not as constraining as the U.S. copyright indus-
tries imagine.125  
We cannot further delve into those arguments in these pages.  
Rather we present Israel’s adoption and application of fair use as a 
case study that, at the very  least, calls into question the copyright 
industries’ blanket assertion that other countries’ adoption of fair 
use doctrine will inevitably lead to chaotic uncertainty and license 
for piracy, thus significantly undermining copyright  holder rights.  
 
III. ISRAEL’S ADOPTION OF FAIR USE 
In broad brush strokes, the U.S. and Israel followed similar 
paths to adopting fair use. In both countries, fair use was initially 
formulated and developed in case law, and subsequently codified as 
part of a general copyright statute revision. But in Israel, the Su-
preme Court adopted fair use within the framework of Israel’s pre-
copyright revision fair dealing exception. That landmark ruling has 
continued to influence fair use case law in Israel even after the Knes-
set replaced fair dealing with fair use.  
This Part fleshes out key elements of Israel’s adoption of fair 
                                                                                                             
123 See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright; Can the EU Author’s Rights Ac-
commodate Fair Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS, supra note 21, at 275, 282-83 (explaining why “the advantage of 
legal certainty that is usually ascribed to the European system of precisely defined 
exceptions should not be overstated”). 
124 See, generally, Senftleben, supra note 24.  
125 See Hugenholtz & Seftleben, supra note 76 at 20-23 (arguing that the three-
step test should properly be understood to give courts flexibility to interpret cop-
yright exceptions and limitations liberally, thus effecting a balance between au-
thors’ rights and the broader public interest in accommodating new technological 
uses of existing expression); Hughes, supra note 21, at 242-48 (suggesting that 
only specific judicial applications of §107, not §107 on its face, might violate the 
three-step test of TRIPS, Article 13). 
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use, focusing on two milestones: first, the judicial incorporation of 
fair use into fair dealing, and second, the codification of fair use in 
the Copyright Law 2007. With that backdrop, we also foreground 
U.S. opposition to the Knesset’s replacement of fair dealing with 
fair use. The next Part presents our empirical findings regarding the 
first decade of case law following the effective date of fair use’s 
codification in the Copyright Act 2007.     
A. Courts: Melding together Fair Dealing and Fair Use    
 
Israel’s Copyright Law 2007 replaced the U.K. Copyright Act 
of 1911, which applied to British Mandate Palestine,126 and re-
mained in force after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. 
As noted above, in the Copyright Act of 1911, the U.K. Parliament 
codified the fair dealing defense to copyright infringement. Section 
2(1)(i) of the Act provided that “any fair dealing with any work for 
the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review or newspa-
per summary” did not constitute copyright infringement.127 
The Israeli Supreme Court’s landmark 1993 ruling in Geva v. 
Walt Disney Co. concerned Disney’s claim that Dudu Geva, a re-
nowned Israeli caricaturist, had infringed Disney’s copyright in its 
cartoon character Donald Duck.128 Geva had authored a cartoon 
book that included a story centered on Geva’s cartoon character 
Moby Duck. Moby Duck looked nearly identical to Donald Duck, 
but Moby sported an iconic Israeli hat often worn by Kibbutz mem-
bers in the fifties and sixties. Geva’s story highlighted the subse-
quent decline of the Kibbutz movement. Geva argued that his 
adaptation of Donald Duck in that context was protected free speech 
and a parody, which was permitted under the Copyright Act of 
1911’s fair dealing exception.  
The Supreme Court, which issued its ruling just two months 
                                                                                                             
126 See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 37(2)(a) (Eng.); see also Copy-
right Ordinance, CURRENT LAW 389. The Copyright Ordinance was amended 
several times by the Knesset. See id. The transitional provisions of the 2007 Law 
provide that the Copyright Act of 1911, 3 Annotated Laws of Palestine 2475, and 
the Copyright Ordinance of 1924 continue to apply to certain matters. See 2007 
Copyright Law § 78.  
127 Copyright Act 1911, §2(1)(i) (U.K.) 
128 See CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Inc. 48(1) PD 251 (1993) (Isr.). 
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prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal fair use ruling in Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., discussed pre-Campbell case law and 
commentary in considerable detail. In so doing, the Court drew a 
sharp contrast between U.S. fair use doctrine’s flexible, open-ended 
character versus the closed-list UK fair dealing exception then in 
force in Israel. The Court expressed a clear normative preference for 
U.S. fair use. As the Court stated:  “[T]he American arrangement is 
much more advanced and is, when compared to the 1911 law, a more 
desired arrangement. … It seems that the American legislator pre-
ferred to create a flexible arrangement, one that enables maximal 
consideration in the circumstances of each and every case.”  
While the Court ultimately held that it was bound to apply the 
fair dealing exception in the Israeli statute, it ruled that the each of 
the enumerated uses was to be broadly interpreted given that the fair 
dealing exception must reflect a balance between the rights of the 
copyright owner and other public and social interests.129 In that re-
gard, the Court broadly interpreted the fair dealing category of “crit-
icism.” It held that “criticism” may include not only parody (i.e., 
targeting the copyright owner’s work for ridicule) but also satire 
(i.e., using a work to target some person, artistic genre, or social 
phenomenon other than the copyright owner’s work).130  
However, the Court further held that not every use for purposes 
of criticism constitutes fair dealing. To qualify as fair dealing, the 
Court held, it is not enough that the use falls within one of the enu-
merated types of uses in the statute – what the Court termed the 
“purpose of the use test.” The use, rather, must also satisfy a second 
requirement, that of “fairness of the use.” And the Court adopted 
the four-factor analysis of U.S. fair use law, as codified in Section 
107 of the Copyright Act, to determine fairness.131  
In applying the “purpose and character” of use under the first 
factor, the Court considered whether the use was commercial, and 
also whether it has promoted a new purpose, different from that of 
                                                                                                             
129 Geva at 273. 
130 Id.  (“It seems that the term “criticism” for the purposes of article 2(1)(1) 
should be interpreted in a broad sense. The freedom of speech and creativity, 
while they cannot change the law per se, do influence … the shaping of the law 
through means of interpretation. Therefore, we recommend accepting a broad in-
terpretation and including critiques in the form of parody and satire in the category 
of artistic criticism.”) 
131 Id, at 275-76 
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the original work.132 The Court emphasized that satires and other 
socially beneficial uses may sometimes qualify as fair use even if 
they are commercial. But the Court was not convinced that Geva’s 
literal copying of Disney’s entire work truly served any satirical ef-
fect.133 After considering all four factors, the Court held that Geva’s 
use had failed to meet the test of fairness. It accordingly rejected 
Geva’s fair dealing defense.134 
In sum, in Geva, the Israeli Supreme Court applied U.S. fair 
use doctrine within the framework of the English fair dealing pro-
visions, thereby creating a two-pronged test. Under Geva, Israeli 
courts considering fair dealing defenses had to determine, first, 
whether the purpose of the defendant’s use fell under any of the pur-
poses explicitly enumerated by the U.K. law, and second, whether 
the use met the test of fairness of use based on the four factors of 
U.S. fair use doctrine. A use could qualify as fair dealing only when 
both tests were met. Following Geva, the hybrid doctrine of fair 
dealing/fair use remained the dominant approach in Israel until fair 
dealing was finally replaced by fair use in the Copyright Act 2007. 
  
B. Copyright Reform: From Fair Dealing to Fair Use  
 
The Knesset enacted fair use in Section 19 of the Copyright 
Law 2007 as part of a major copyright reform.135 As in the U.S. 
Copyright Act, the fair use exception stands alongside and inde-
pendently from specific exceptions and limitations for particular 
uses, including the making of certain copies by public libraries and 
                                                                                                             
132 Id, at 276.  
133 Id., at 283. 
134 The Court’s rejection of Geva’s fair use claim has been sharply criticized by 
later commentators. See, e.g., Birnhack, supra note 29, at 275 (concluding that 
“[t]he Court did not recognize the transformative nature of the use and over-em-
phasized the (minor) commercial aspect”).  
135. See Copyright Law (2007). The Act was passed by the Israeli Parliament (the 
Knesset) on November 19, 2007, and came into force on May 25, 2008. See also 
id. § 77. However, pursuant to the Law’s transitional provisions, an unauthorized 
use of a copyrighted work that takes place prior to May 25, 2008 and that qualifies 
as fair use will not be deemed infringing. See id. § 78(c); See also TAMIR AFORI, 
COPYRIGHT ACT 540 (2012) (Hebrew).  
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archives;136 public performances in educational institutions;137and 
making certain transient and incidental copies.138  
The fair use provision under the Israeli Copyright Law 2007 
is very similar, but not identical, to the U.S. provision. Section 19 
provides as follows: 
(a) Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as: 
private study, research, criticism, review, journalistic 
reporting, quotation, or instruction and examination 
by an educational institution. 
(b) In determining whether a use made of a work is fair 
within the meaning of this section, the factors to be 
considered shall include, inter alia, all of the follow-
ing: 
1) The purpose and character of the use; 
2) The character of the work used; 
3) The scope of the use, quantitatively and quali-
tatively, in relation to the work as a whole; 
4) The impact of the use on the value of the work 
and its potential market. 
(c) The Minister [of Justice] may make regulations pre-
scribing conditions under which a use shall be deemed a 
fair use.  
The Ministry of Justice explanatory notes accompanying the 
proposed new copyright law stated that, despite Geva’s instruction 
that the purposes enumerated in Copyright Law of 1911’s fair deal-
ing provision must be liberally interpreted, the closed list provision 
presented significant practical difficulties given the wide variety of 
                                                                                                             
136. Id. § 30-31. These sections exempt certain uses in libraries and archives of the 
type prescribed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education, for the 
purpose of preservation. 
137. Id. § 29.  
138. Id. § 26 (permitting transient and incidental copies made as an integral part of 
communication conducted by an intermediary network and making transient cop-
ies when necessary to enable lawful use of the work, provided that the copy does 
not have significant economic value in itself); §25 (permitting certain recording 
of works for purposes of authorized broadcast); §24 (permitting certain copying 
or making derivative works of a computer program); §23 (permitting certain 
broadcast or copying of works in public place); §22 (permitting certain incidental 
uses of works); §21 (permitting certain copying of works deposited for public in-
spection); §20 (permitting certain uses of works in legal or administrative pro-
ceedings); 28A (permitting certain copying and adaptation to facilitate access to 
works for persons with disabilities). 
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uses of creative expression that advance the fundamental purposes 
of copyright law.139 Further, it would be extraordinarily difficult for 
the legislature to set out a comprehensive closed list enumerating 
such a wide variety of desirable uses, especially given the increas-
ingly expansive reach of copyright holders’ rights under case law 
and the proposed legislation.  Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice 
explained, subsection (a) of the proposed  provision would provide 
an open list of purposes that would enable courts to determine that 
worthy uses are noninfringing “fair use” and thus to assist courts in 
achieving balanced results in light of the expansion of copyright 
holders’ rights.140 
With respect to the four factors set out in subsection (b), the 
Ministry of Justice noted, again citing Geva, that in interpreting 
“fairness” under the fair dealing provision, Israeli courts had largely 
adopted the arrangement set out in the U.S. statute.141 In that vein, 
the Ministry explained – in language very much in line with U.S. 
doctrine, courts are to consider the four factors, but may consider 
other factors as well. Further, no single factor should be determina-
tive. Rather, all the factors should be weighed against one another 
to determine whether a use qualifies a fair use. 
The Ministry of Justice also provided some explanation for 
each statutory factor. Of note, Ministry states, along the lines of U.S. 
fair use doctrine that the first factor is meant to distinguish between 
commercial uses and not-for-profit uses for study and research.142 
By contrast, the explanatory notes do not mention “transformative” 
uses.143 However, in presenting the proposed copyright law revision 
to the Knesset committee considering the legislation, the Ministry’s 
lead representative explained that the fair use provision was in-
tended to permit copying that has a clear public value, “which the 
American literature has termed ‘transformative use.’”144 Finally, the 
explanatory notes state that the fourth factor expresses, among other 
                                                                                                             
139 Proposed Copyright Law 2005, Reshumot, Proposed Law 196, July 20, 2005, 
at p. 1116, 1125 [hereinafter Proposed Copyright Law].  
140 Id. 
141 Id at 1126. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Knesset, Economic Committee, Meeting Minutes No. 128, 17th Knesset, State-
ment of Tamir Afori, Israeli Ministry of Justice, December 12, 2006, p 14 (Isr.), 
available at  https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Pages/AllCommit-
teeProtocols.aspx?ItemID=182266 [hereinafter Knesset Economic Committee 
Minutes]. 
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things, Israel’s obligation to comply with the three-step test set out 
in TRIPS Article 13.145 
The Ministry of Justice’s lead representative also explained 
that in proposing the fair use provision, the Ministry intended to 
adopt the American model, including not just the language of Sec-
tion 107, but also the case law regarding it. As such, the Ministry 
opposed adding additional factors to Section 19(b) because that 
might confuse Israeli courts into thinking that “we are different than 
the United States.”146 Following that view, the Ministry’s lead rep-
resentative later wrote, in a comprehensive treatise on Israel’s Cop-
yright Law 2007, that the Knesset’s clear legislative intent in 
enacting the fair use provision was, inter alia, to “direct the public 
and the courts to the extensive fair use case law that had accumu-
lated in the United States, and not to develop new rules in a vac-
uum.”147 
Yet, despite their overall similarity, there are some important 
differences between the Israeli and American fair use provisions. 
First, the Israeli statute preserves the two-step structure of fair deal-
ing. To qualify as fair use, a use must satisfy both of two independ-
ent requirements: the purpose test, codified in Section 19(a), and the 
fairness test, codified in Section 19(b). In its recent ruling in Société 
des Produits Nestle v. Espresso Club Ltd.148 the Supreme Court re-
iterated that the Section 19(a) is a prerequisite to fair use. If a use 
does not fall within any of the enumerated purposes, or any purpose 
of the same sort, it cannot be considered fair use and there is no need 
to determine its fairness under Section 19(b). By contrast, under 
U.S. fair use doctrine, courts consider the purpose of use under the 
first factor. Accordingly, the purpose of use is weighed together with 
the other factors as part of the overall fair use analysis.  
Second, while Section 19(a) provides for an open-ended list 
of purposes, in contrast with the closed list of fair dealing, it is not 
quite as open ended as the introductory clause to Section 107. As 
initially drafted, Section 19(a) provided that fair use is permitted, 
“inter alia,” for the enumerated uses, meaning that, much like Sec-
                                                                                                             
145 Proposed Copyright Law, supra note 139, at 1126. 
146 Knesset Economic Committee Minutes, supra note 144, at 21 (authors’ trans-
lation from Hebrew original) 
147 AFORI, supra note 135, at 208 (authors’ translation from Hebrew original). 
148 C.A. 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestle v. Nespresso Club Ltd.  (SC August 
7, 2019). 
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tion 107, the enumerated uses were meant entirely as illustrative ex-
amples. As enacted, however, Section 19(a) provides that fair use is 
permitted for purposes “such as” the enumerated uses. In other 
words, to qualify as fair use, a use must be for a purpose that has 
some characteristic in common with those enumerated in Section 
19(a).149  Some commentators conclude that virtually any use could 
qualify has having such a purpose.150 But, at least in principle, Sec-
tion 19(a) imposes some limit on the types of uses that can qualify 
as fair use. 
Third, Section 19(b) lacks an explicit reference to commer-
cial use in the first factor. Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act 
provides that courts should consider “the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes.”151 By contrast, Section 19 of 
Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, defines the first factor only as “the 
purpose and character of the use”.152 Nonetheless, as indicated 
above, the Ministry of Justice explanatory notes, like the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Geva, state that the use’s commercial nature is to 
be considered in weighing the first factor, even if commercial nature 
is not definitive. Hence, there would seem to be little or no practical 
difference in effect between Israeli and U.S. fair use with regard to 
commercial uses. 
Finally, unlike Section 107, Section 19(c) of the Israeli fair 
use provision authorizes a regulatory body, specifically the Minister 
of Justice, to “issue regulations prescribing conditions under which 
a use shall be deemed a fair use.”153 This provision aimed to reduce 
the uncertainty resulting from the open ended nature of the fair use 
doctrine. However, Israel’s Ministry of Justice has yet to issue any 
such regulations.  
 
C. U.S. Copyright Industry Opposition to Israel’s Enactment of 
Fair Use 
 
                                                                                                             
149 By contrast the U.S. Copyright provides explicitly that the term “such as” is 
illustrative, not limitative. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
150 See, e.g., AFORI, supra note 136, at 199 (stating that it is difficult to conceive 
of a purpose that would be so different than those enumerated such that it could 
not meet the “such as” requirement). 
151 17 USC §107 
152 Copyright Law (2007), § 19(b)(1). 
 153.  Id. § 19(c). 
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The IIPA actively opposed Israel’s transition from fair deal-
ing to fair use.154 The IIPA acknowledged that Israel’s proposed fair 
use provision, including the four factors set out in Section 19(b), 
closely tracked that of the United States. But as it has in other coun-
tries, the copyright industry trade association contrasted the newness 
of the proposed fair use provision in Israel with the U.S., where 
“many years of jurisprudence have provided … considerable clarity 
on the boundaries of ‘fair use.’”155 Accordingly, the IIPA asserted: 
There is a significant risk that in Israel adoption of 
these factors at this time might be viewed by the 
community as a free ticket to copy. This would have 
disastrous consequences, and thus we urge the Israeli 
government to re-examine the introduction of these 
factors, rather than relying on Section 19(a), which 
sets out the long-established “fair dealing” principle, 
followed by specific exceptions dealing with certain 
special cases.156 
If Israel nevertheless replaced fair dealing with fair use, the 
IIPA insisted, Section 19(b)(1) must be amended expressly to in-
clude the phrase “whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for 
non-profit educational purposes.”157 The copyright industry trade 
association was not content to rely on the Knesset Report and Israeli 
case law for ensuring that a use’s commercial nature would weight 
against a finding of fair use. 
 The IIPA also contended that “it is essential that the law im-
plement the established Berne ‘three-part test’ (incorporated into 
TRIPS)…. In other words, it should be codified in Section 18 that 
no exception in Israel’s law (whether fair dealing, “fair use,” or a 
                                                                                                             
154 See Knesset Economic Committee Minutes, supra note 144, at 25 (Statement 
of Tamir Afori, Ministry of Justice representative, confirming that the IIPA had 
filed comments with Ministry opposing the transition from a closed list of permit-
ted uses under fair dealing to an open list under fair use). 
155 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007 Special 301 Report Israel, 
at 71 (2007), available at http://www.iipaweb-
site.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301ISRAEL.pdf. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. Ironically, the phrase distinguishing commercial from non-profit educa-
tional uses was added to Section 107 to accord favorable fair use treatment to the 
latter, at the insistence of educators who had unsuccessfully lobbied for a blanket 
exception for all copying done for nonprofit educational purposes. See Samuel-
son, supra note 53, at 23-24.  
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specific exception may be applied [in any way that does not meet 
the three-step test].”158  
 Finally, subsequently to Israel’s enactment of fair use, the 
IIPA expressed concern over Section 19(c)’s authorization of the 
Ministry of Justice to issue regulations clarifying fair use. As the 
IIPA stated: “Fair use is a case-by-case fact-based inquiry. This dis-
cretion seemingly without standard on the part of the Minister po-
tentially opens the door for even broader exceptions to be introduced 
in Israel. IIPA seeks clarification as to what the possible checks are 
to this seemingly unlimited discretion.”159 
 The State of Israel responded to the copyright industry ob-
jections in a statement it submitted to the United States Trade Rep-
resentative.160 It stressed the close similarity between the Israeli and 
U.S. fair use provisions, proclaiming, indeed, that Section 19 is “vir-
tually identical” to Section 107.161 With respect to copyright indus-
try concerns about the absence of judicial precedent on fair use in 
Israeli, the State of Israel provided assurance that Israeli case law 
would draw upon that of the U.S.: “A body of case law interpretation 
of section 19 will develop and no doubt American case law will pro-
vide persuasive precedent on this point, as American case law often 
does in Israeli copyright law in general.”162 
The State of Israel also highlighted the inconsistency in the 
IIPA’s insistence that Israel’s copyright statute codify the three step 
test. Its response asserts:  
Neither Berne, nor TRIPS, requires that the exact 
language of a treaty general principle be copied ver-
batim into national legislation. Indeed, if that were 
the case then the IIPA would also have to claim that 
Section 107 "Fair Use" of the U.S. Copyright Act is 
in violation of Berne Article 9(2).163 
 
                                                                                                             
158 International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 155. at 70. 
159 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2009 Special 301 Report Israel, at 
208 (2009). 
160 2009 SUBMISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE 
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE 
2009 “SPECIAL 301 REVIEW”, March 2009, available at https://www.jus-
tice.gov.il/Units/YeutzVehakika/NosimMishpatim/Global/2009special301sub-
mission.pdf. 
161 Id. at 13. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
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Finally, Israel deflected the IIPA objection to possible fair 
use regulation by Israel’s Ministry of Justice: “To the extent that 
regulations can be promulgated under the new section 19 with re-
gard to specifying fair uses, such regulations are always subordinate 
to the primary legislation and cannot contradict it.”164 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ISRAELI AND U.S. FAIR USE 
CASE LAW 
 From the vantage point of over a decade since Israel’s enact-
ment of fair use took effect, we can now begin to assess empirically 
the U.S. copyright industry’s principal objections to Israel’s adop-
tion of fair use. In this Part, we report the results of our comprehen-
sive study of Israeli and U.S. fair use case law.   
We reviewed all reported fair use rulings issued by Israeli 
courts during the first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use pro-
vision, Section 19 of Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, was in effect. 
That period extends from May 19, 2008, to May 18, 2018.  During 
that decade, Israeli courts ruled on whether the defendant’s use qual-
ifies as fair use in a total of 55 reported rulings. Of these, 34 rulings 
were issued by Magistrate Courts, 18 by District Courts, and 3 by 
the Supreme Court.165 Of the lower court rulings, one was upheld on 
appeal and one was reversed.166 For ease of reference, we label this 
study our “Israel Study.” 
 Throughout, we compare the results of our Israel Study with 
empirical studies of U.S. fair use case law, including a parallel study 
we conducted of U.S. fair use case law during the same ten-year 
period as the Israel Study. That parallel study of U.S. fair use case 
law includes 185 reported rulings, of which 157 were by district 
courts, 28 were by appellate courts, and none were by the Supreme 
Court. For ease of reference, we label our parallel study of U.S. fair 
use case law, our “U.S. Study.” 
We present our results in comparison with U.S. fair use case 
law to provide a baseline for assessing whether the primary concern 
                                                                                                             
164 Id.   
165 Magistrate Courts are trial courts that have jurisdiction over civil claims for 
less than 2.5 million shekels (the equivalent of roughly $725,000). District Courts 
are both trial courts that have jurisdiction over larger claims and courts of appeal 
for cases that originate in Magistrate Court. Appeals from District Courts are di-
rectly to the Supreme Court. 
166 To better assess Israeli courts’ understandings of fair use, we count all rulings, 
including the ruling that was reversed on appeal. 
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raised by the U.S. copyright industries in opposition to Israel’s en-
actment of fair use has been realized in practice. Have Israeli courts 
lacking familiarity with the “carefully-honed jurisprudence” of U.S. 
fair use doctrine interpreted fair use in a loose manner that severely 
undermines copyright protection in comparison with the experience 
with fair use in the U.S.? In that regard, we also test Israel’s response 
that U.S. copyright industry objections are fundamentally misguided 
because Israeli courts will, no doubt, look to U.S. precedent to guide 
their interpretation of Section 19, which, after all, is closely mod-




Before we present the results of our studies, a caveat is in 
order. Our studies look to the outcomes and express rationales that 
courts present in reported judicial rulings. As such, they are subject 
to the same limitations as commentators have detailed with respect 
to similar empirical studies.167  
Most importantly, while reported judicial rulings have great 
importance for understanding fair use, they capture only the cases 
that were of sufficient uncertainty of outcome and of sufficient mon-
etary value that both parties saw fit to litigate through at least one 
judicial ruling.168 Nor does a study of reported cases directly reflect 
the myriad decisions related to copyright that are not related to liti-
gation, including those that inform licensing and unilateral decisions 
about when to copy or refrain from copying existing works.169  
In addition, our empirical studies do not attempt to dive un-
der the hood, to explore what unexpressed considerations, biases, 
factors, and result oriented jurisprudence might actually be driving 
judicial rulings on fair use. To attempt to do so would have intro-
duced undue speculation, distortions, inconsistencies, and unrelia-
bility in scoring the rulings. As such, one might say that our studies 
                                                                                                             
167 See Netanel, supra note 37, 731-34 (surveying the literature); see also Sag, 
supra note 40, at 83. 
168 The pioneer study of reported case selection biases is George L. Priest & Ben-
jamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal. Stud. 1 (1984). 
See also Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get 
Litigated?, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1265 (2002). 
169 See Christopher A. Cotropia and James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An 
Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2014). 
46 DRAFT   2020 
report what courts say they are doing, not necessarily what courts 
are actually doing. 
That said, however, our statistical analysis in the Israel Study 
shows that various factors external to those that Israeli courts ex-
pressly identify in their fair use jurisprudence have no statistically 
significant correlation with the finding of fair use. These include the 
type of litigants (individuals, corporations, non-profits, or govern-
ment agencies), types of works alleged to have been infringed (such 
as photographs, audiovisual works, or literary works), and the types 
of works created by the alleged infringers. We are thus reasonably 
confident that our results do not reflect idiosyncrasies in the mix of 
litigants or categories of works at issue during the period of our 
study. Rather, the doctrinal factors that Israeli courts have cited as 
part of their fair use analysis and that do have a statistically signifi-
cant correlation with fair use outcomes appear to drive the courts’ 
fair use rulings and to form the foundations of Israel’s fair use doc-
trine during the period of our study.   
B. Results 
1. Case Outcomes on Fair Use 
During the ten-year period of our study, Israeli courts were 
significantly less likely than their U.S. counterparts to rule that a use 
qualifies as fair use. Of the 55 rulings in our Israel Study, the court 
determined that the allegedly infringing use failed to qualify as a fair 
use in a substantial majority of the cases. The court rejected the al-
leged infringer’s fair use defense in 39 cases, just over 70% of the 
total. The court ruled that the use was a fair use in just 16 cases, 
slightly less than 30% of the total.  
 By contrast, a plurality of the 185 rulings in our U.S. Study 
favored the alleged infringer on the issue of fair use. In the United 
States, the court rejected fair use in 75 cases, or 40.5% of the total, 
and ruled that the use was a fair use in 90 cases, or 48.6% of the 
total. Of the remaining cases, the court ruled that further proceedings 
were needed to determine outstanding questions of fact in 18 cases 
(less than 10% of the total), and issued a mixed result, partly favor-
ing the plaintiff and partly the defendant, in two cases.  




What could explain this dramatic difference in fair use out-
comes? It might stem in part from variations in statutory language. 
In particular, the Israeli provision retains something of fair dealing’s 
two-part structure, providing that to qualify as fair use, a use must 
satisfy both the purpose requirement and the fairness requirement. 
We return to that possible explanation below.170    
Another possible explanation is that, Israeli courts have 
taken substantive positions on certain aspects of fair use that have 
contributed to less friendly outcomes for the fair use defense than 
under U.S. fair use doctrine, at least during the ten-year period of 
our study.  To shed light on that explanation, we reviewed each of 
the 39 Israeli rulings that rejected fair use. Somewhat speculatively, 
we assessed whether, in our considered judgment, the fair use de-
fense might have been accepted if the same facts were before a U.S. 
court. In our view, U.S. courts would have rejected fair use in the 
vast majority of cases. Indeed, several Israeli cases involved fair use 
claims that we regard as spurious. However, some nontrivial frac-
tion of the cases in which the Israeli courts rejected fair use might 
have resulted in a favorable ruling on fair use had the same case 
come before a U.S. court applying U.S. copyright law. For example, 
a number of Israeli rulings held that using iconic decades-old news 
photographs to present historical documentation of significant 
events in Israel’s history or to background news coverage on new 
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developments did not qualify as fair use, largely because the defend-
ant had failed to give authorship credit to the photographer.171 By 
contrast, the use of photographs and graphic images as historical ar-
tifacts and documentation has generally (although not universally) 
been held to be fair use in the U.S.172 Moreover, as discussed below, 
the failure to give authorship credit is a non-issue in U.S. fair use 
cases.173 
At the same, it is possible that the sharp disparity in fair use 
outcomes reflects some difference in litigation rules and practice be-
tween the two countries. Factors such as litigation costs, the availa-
bility and size of statutory damage awards, awards of attorney’s fees 
and costs to prevailing parties, judicial power and propensity to dis-
pose of cases and discrete issues in cases prior to trial, judicial en-
couragement of pretrial settlement, the ready availability of 
copyright licensing (including through collective rights manage-
ment organizations), and the presence of repeat players in the field 
can impact the mix of copyright cases and case outcomes.174 The 
                                                                                                             
171 See, e.g., Ephraim Sharir v. Teetell Arutzei Tikshoret (use of news photo as it 
appeared in Lebanese press in story about Lebanese ridicule of Israeli leaders); 
Shmuel Rakhmani v. Israeli Basketball Super League Administration Ltd  (use of 
news photo in League’s exhibition commemorating 60 years of Israeli basketball 
history); Shmuel Rakhmani v. Israel News Corporation Ltd. (use of news photo 
in documentary about significant events in Israel’s history). 
172 The classic case is Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc. 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), holding that copying the iconic Zapruder photographs of the 
John F. Kennedy assassination to provide the public with information on that ma-
jor historical event was fair use. See also Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737 
F.3d 932, 944–45 (4th Cir. 2013) (National Football League’s copying of graphic 
image of football team’s former logo in documentary video and football team’s 
public display of former logo in exhibition featuring memorabilia from the team's 
history are fair use); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 
605, 609-10 (2nd Cir. 2006) (use of concert poster art to illustrate a historical bi-
ography of rock band is fair use); Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 
18, 22–23 (1st Cir.2000)(republication of photographs taken for a modeling port-
folio in a newspaper was transformative because the photos served to inform, as 
well as entertain); Philpot v. Media Research Center, 279 F.Supp.3d 708 (E.D. 
Virg. 2018) (defendant’s use of plaintiff’s photographs of famous musicians to 
accompany online articles about those musicians’ political views constitutes fair 
use). But see Monge v. Maya Magazines 688 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012) (9th 
Cir. 2012) (celebrity gossip magazine’s publication of previously unpublished 
photographs of plaintiff’s clandestine wedding is not fair use). 
173 See text accompanying notes – infra. 
174 For example, the scholarly literature has shown that under certain conditions, 
the English Rule, under which the losing party pays the winning party’s attorney’s 
fees, engenders a mix of litigated cases having a higher possibility that plaintiffs 
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possible extent, if any, of litigant selection effects arising from such 
factors and their possible impact on fair use case outcomes are be-
yond the scope of our study.175 
Finally, in comparing U.S. and Israeli courts acceptance of 
the fair use defense, it is important to reiterate that fair use outcomes 
in the United States have shifted over time. U.S. courts became far 
more receptive to fair use defenses after the transformative use ap-
proach came to dominate fair use case law, roughly following the 
Second Circuit’s embrace of the approach in the Grateful Dead con-
cert posters case in 2006. In his study of fair use case law from 1978 
through 2005, Barton Beebe found that defendants’ fair use win rate 
for district rulings that were not reversed on appeal was only 
32.1%.176 But as a later study showed, that fair use win rate rose 
                                                                                                             
will prevail than under the American Rule, under which no attorney fee shifting 
occurs. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee 
Shifting, 47 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 139, 140-42 (1984). However, 
we doubt that result obtains in our study. Israel follows the English Rule, but, for 
all intents and purposes, so does the U.S. in copyright cases, even if U.S. courts 
have stopped short of formally adopting the English Rule. See Steven J. Horowitz, 
Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 341 (2012) (noting 
that attorney’s fees are awarded to prevailing copyright owners “as a matter of 
course despite being nominally discretionary”); Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Com-
ment, Attorney's Fee Awards in Federal Copyright Litigation After Fogerty v. 
Fantasy: Defendants are Winning Fees More Often, But the New Standard Still 
Favors Prevailing Plaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1381 (2000) (presenting empirical 
study finding that U.S. courts granted motions for attorney’s fees to prevailing 
copyright infringement plaintiffs in 89% of the cases and to prevailing copyright 
infringement defendants in 61% of the cases).  
175 We are also aware of the Priest-Klein hypothesis that outcomes in civil litiga-
tion should generally approximate 50% since parties will settle all but the most 
uncertain cases. As Priest and Klein recognize, however, there are various excep-
tions to that hypothesis. See Netanel, supra note 40, at 753-53 (discussing Priest-
Klein hypothesis and its exceptions); see also Liu, supra note 44, at 167 n.19; John 
R. Allison , Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness 
and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 670-71 (2016). In particular, potential fair use 
outcomes were probably subject to considerable uncertainty during the period of 
our study, during the first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use provision was 
in effect and during a longer period, extending back to the mid-1990s, in which 
U.S. fair use doctrine was in flux. 
176 Beebe’s data was limited to unreversed district court rulings on motions for 
preliminary injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions for summary judgment. 
He considered just crossed motions for summary judgment because courts are 
generally more likely to publish an opinion granting summary judgment than 
denying it. As a result, if cases where only one party moves for summary judg-
ment are included, the results will be skewed by whether plaintiffs or defendants 
file more such motions. Beebe, supra note 41, at 576-78. 
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dramatically during the period 2006 through 2010 to 58.3%.177 
Moreover, recent years have seen a possible retreat from U. S. 
courts’ defendant-friendly approach to fair use. Our U.S. Study 
showed a statistically significant turn away from accepting the fair 
use defense during the last two years of our study, as U.S. courts 
became less willing to find that the defendant’s use is transforma-
tive.178 From May 25, 2014 through May 24, 2016, U.S. courts ruled 
that the use was fair use in 64.1% of the cases. But from May 25, 
2016 through May 24, 2018, U.S. courts ruled that the use was fair 
use in only 35.5% of the cases.179 Hence, while fair use win rates in 
Israel were substantially lower than in the U.S. during full ten years 
period of our study, win rates in Israel are much closer to those in 
the U.S. during the last two years of our study and during the period 
prior to U.S. courts’ decided embrace of the transformative use ap-
proach in 2006. 
   At bottom, while Israeli courts ruled against fair use at a 
markedly higher rate than did U.S. courts during the period of our 
study, we do not want to overstate the significance of that data point. 
On one hand, it is, indeed, quite clear that Israel’s enactment of fair 
use has not resulted in a “free ticket to copy” with “disastrous con-
sequences” for copyright owners, U.S. copyright industry dire pre-
dictions notwithstanding. But the extent, if any, to which Israel’s 
markedly less fair-use friendly outcomes truly reflects a signifi-
cantly more restrictive substantive understanding of fair use among 
Israeli courts than under U.S. fair use doctrine requires further study. 
Moreover, to compare the two is, necessarily, to aim at a moving 
target as U.S. and Israeli fair use doctrine evolve over time. 
2. Influence of U.S. Precedent 
 
Judicial citations to rulings of other courts are a commonly 
used metric for the influence of those other courts. For example, 
                                                                                                             
177 Netanel, supra note 40, at 755 (showing win rates for unreversed district court 
rulings on motions for preliminary injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions 
for summary judgment). 
178 Our U.S. Study showed that courts found the defendant’s use to be transform-
ative in 63% of the cases during the two-year period, May 25, 2015 through May 
24, 2016, but in only 43% of the cases during the final two-year period of our 
study. 
179 The Pearson chi-square measure of statistical significance for the shift in fair 
use outcome from the first of those two-year periods to the second is 0.041.  
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Barton Beebe concluded, based on case citations, that fair use rul-
ings from courts of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal 
exerted an overwhelming influence on fair use rulings outside those 
Circuits during the period of his empirical fair use case law study.180  
Applying the metric of case citations to our study leads to 
what, at first glance, is a startling result. Contrary to Israel’s asser-
tion that Israeli courts would look to U.S. fair use precedent for guid-
ance regarding how to interpret and apply Israel’s new fair use 
provision, rulings of U.S. courts seem to have had virtually no direct 
influence on Israeli fair use case law during the first ten years in 
which Israel’s fair use statute was in effect.  Only two Israeli fair use 
rulings cited any U.S. fair use precedent at all. Both cases cited the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.  
Israeli courts made no mention of either of two other seminal U.S 
Supreme Court rulings on fair use, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises. No less dramatically, 
only two Israeli cases made any reference to Section 107 of the U.S. 
Copyright Act. Evidently, in the vast majority of cases, Israeli courts 
saw no reason to cite the U.S. fair use provision from which Section 
19 of the Copyright Act 2007 is derived.  
Yet, despite the general dearth of case citations to U.S. fair 
use precedent in our study, U.S. fair use doctrine clearly has influ-
enced the crafting of fair use doctrine by Israeli courts. First, as dis-
cussed above, the Israeli Supreme Court first introduced fair use 
doctrine into Israeli copyright law in Geva v. Disney, some 14 years 
before the Knesset replaced Israel’s prior fair dealing exception with 
fair use in the Copyright Act 2007. Geva did cite and rely on US 
precedent, including Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios and sev-
eral leading lower court rulings. Geva’s interpretation and applica-
tion of U.S. fair use doctrine remains seminal precedent in Israeli 
fair use case law. Thus, through Geva, U.S. fair use precedent has 
indirectly impacted Israeli fair use case law even if Israeli courts do 
not generally cite the U.S. cases. 
Second, the two rulings in our Israel Study that do reference 
U.S. precedents were Supreme Court cases. During the period of our 
Israel Study, Israel’s Supreme Court addressed fair use in four rul-
ings. In two out of the four, the Court made explicit reference to U.S. 
fair use precedents. Football Association Premier League Ltd v 
                                                                                                             
180 Beebe, supra note 41, at 567-68. 
52 DRAFT   2020 
Anonymous181 involved a petition to unmask the identity of an anon-
ymous user who streamed unauthorized broadcasts of football 
matches owned by the English Premier League. Although the peti-
tion was dismissed on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court stated 
that streaming constituted copyright infringement and that fair use 
did not apply.182 The Court cited Campbell for the transformative 
use approach, and also made extensive references to U.S. law review 
articles. 183 
In another decision, Safecom v Raviv,184 the Israeli Supreme 
Court addressed the copied drawings of a functional electric device 
in a patent application submitted to the USPTO. The Court explicitly 
stated that “the four subordinate criteria listed in section 19(b) of the 
New Law are based on the subordinate criteria that have been laid 
down in the American Copyright Act [see: 17 USC § 107].” The 
Court further cited empirical research on fair use in U.S. copyright 
law, which demonstrated that “although the fourth subordinate cri-
terion – the effect on the potential market – is most often mentioned 
as the decisive factor regarding the fairness of use, the first subordi-
nate criterion – the purpose and nature of the use – does in fact have 
the most marked effect on the decision, the most influential factors 
being the commerciality and transformativeness of the use.”185  Cit-
ing the decision in Football Association Premier League Ltd v 
Anonymous, the Court held that these factors were also the most in-
fluential under Israeli law.186  
Finally, in Nestle,187decided just after the ten-year period of 
our study, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Campbell  to hold 
that the defendant’s parodic use was a transformative use and fair 
use. The Court repeatedly cited other U.S. fair use precedent as well. 
                                                                                                             
 181.  Civil Appeal 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v. 
Anonymous (2012).  For a translation of the district court decision see CC (TA) 
1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (Sept. 2, 2009) (Isr.), 
http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-1636-11.doc. 
 182.  Id. at 2.  
183 E.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessor, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600 (1982) in Premier League;  
184 CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv (Isr. Nov. 18, 2013), English translation 
available at http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opin-
ions/Safecom%2C%20Ltd.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf. 
185 Id., pp. 19-20, citing Barton Beebe, supra note; Netanel, supra note 40.  
186 Id., p. 19.  
187 C.A. 3425/17 (August 7, 2019). 
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At bottom, therefore, U.S. fair use precedent has probably influ-
enced Israeli fair use jurisprudence to a considerably greater extent 
than what might appear from overall case citations. Indeed, the 
dearth of lower court citations to U.S. precedent might reflect the 
economics of litigation more than a decided lack of interest in U.S. 
precedent. Israeli courts will typically not look to foreign law unless 
the parties cite it, and lawyers are unlikely to devote resources to 
uncovering foreign law unless the case is of sufficiently high value 
to warrant that investment. 
  
3. Role of the Four Fair Use Factors in Fair Use Analysis 
U.S. courts almost invariably apply each of the four statutory 
fair use factors as part of their fair use analysis. Indeed, in Campbell, 
the Supreme Court mandated consideration of all four factors. As 
the Court stated: “Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in 
isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”188  
Israel’s fair use provision likewise states that courts must 
consider all four of the factors. Section 19 provides: “In determining 
whether a use made of a work is fair within the meaning of this sec-
tion the factors to be considered shall include, inter alia, all of the 
following: [the four factors].”  Nonetheless, in its 2012 ruling in 
Football Association Premier League, the Israeli Supreme Court 
held that “[t]hese are not necessary or accumulative factors, but a 
non-exhaustive list of parameters that might indicate the fairness of 
a particular use of the protected work.” 189  
In line with the Supreme Court’s statement, and despite the 
statutory requirement that “all” factors be weighed, Israeli courts 
seem to view the four factors as suggested guidelines rather than a 
checklist of items that must be expressly addressed in fair use anal-
ysis. Indeed, in almost 40% of the rulings in our Israel Study, the 
court did not expressly apply any of the four fair use factors to the 
facts of the case before it in determining whether the defendant’s 
copying qualified as fair use.  
 
                                                                                                             
188 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
189 Civil Appeal 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v. 
Anonymous (2012). 
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Further, while 51% of the Israeli rulings expressly apply the 
first factor – the purpose and character of the use, significantly less 
than half apply any of the other three factors. Only 20% apply factor 
two – the character of the work used. Only 41.8% apply factor three 
-- the scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to 
the work as a whole. And only 32.7% of Israeli fair use rulings apply 
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4. Weighing the Four Factors 
 In the cases in which Israeli courts do apply one or more of 
the four statutory fair use factors, they, like their U.S. counterparts, 
typically determine whether that factor weighs in favor of or against 
fair use. In the instances in which Israeli courts determine that a stat-
utory factor weighs for or against fair use, that determination lines 
up almost universally with the fair use outcome in the case. For ex-
ample, during the ten-year period of our Israel Study, Israeli courts 
expressly found that the first factor weighed against fair use in 
27.2% of the cases. They rejected the fair use defense in every one 
of those cases. Israeli courts expressly found that the first factor 
weighed in favor of fair use in 26.3% of the cases. They ruled that 
the alleged infringer had made fair use of the plaintiff’s work in 
every one of those cases. When Israeli courts expressly found that 
factors two, three, or four either favored or disfavored fair use, that 
finding also substantially lined up with the court’s ruling on fair use 
overall, albeit by slightly less than a 100 percent correlation. 
Notwithstanding the strong correlation between Israeli 
courts’ findings on the statutory factors and fair use outcomes, only 
factor one appears to have much valence in explaining fair use out-
comes in Israel. Our Israel Study shows a statistically significant 
correlation between an Israeli court’s determination on factor one 
and the court’s ruling on the overall issue of fair use.190  And, as 
noted above, Israeli courts expressly applied the first factor in 
slightly more than half the cases during the ten-year period of our 
study. Of the other factors, only factor two has a statistically signif-
icant correlation with overall fair use outcomes. But since only 20% 
of the cases even mention factor two, it is unlikely that judicial de-
terminations of factor two have much effect on fair use outcomes 
overall.191  
                                                                                                             
190 The Fisher’s exact test measure of statistical significance for the correlation of 
a judicial finding that factor one weighs against fair use with a fair use outcome 
that rejects fair use is two-sided p<=0.0025. The Fisher’s exact test measure of 
statistical significance for the correlation of a judicial finding that factor one fa-
vors fair use with a fair use outcome that finds fair use is two-sided p<=0.0001. 
The Fisher exact test is used to measure statistical significance where the size of 
the data sample is sufficiently small so that Chi-Square might not be a valid test. 
191 We rely only on bivariate correlations because logistic regression analysis is 
not suited to our study. See text accompanying note – infra.  
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In the United States, factor one also has the strongest corre-
lation with fair use outcome. However, unlike in Israel, the correla-
tion between factor four and fair use outcome is statistically 
significant as well.192 U.S. fair use jurisprudence also differs from 
Israeli case law in which sub-factors of factor one are most strongly 
correlated with fair use outcome and thus that seem to drive judicial 
rulings on fair use. In the U.S., courts have identified three sub-fac-
tors pertaining to the purpose and the character of the defendant’s 
use.193 These are whether (1) the use is transformative, (2) the use is 
commercial, and (3) the defendant used the copyrighted work in 
good faith. In the United States, transformative use appears to play 
a significantly larger role in determining fair use outcomes than do 
the other two sub-factors. Indeed, Liu’s study finds that when courts 
found factor one to favor fair use, only transformative use was sta-
tistically significant among the sub-factors.194  
In Israel, as further elucidated below, although the Supreme 
Court twice referred to transformative use as part of the fair use anal-
ysis,195 the lower courts almost entirely ignored the concept of trans-
formative use during the period of our study. Rather the factors of 
(1) the commercial character of the allegedly infringing use and (2) 
whether the defendant gave authorship credit to the creator of the 
copied work, a factor that has hardly any role at all in U.S. fair use 
jurisprudence, have the strongest correlation with fair use out-
come.196 In our Israel Study, the defendant’s good or bad faith also 
has a statistically significant correlation with fair use outcome when 
measured in a bivariate analysis. 
Of further note, although factor one now has the strongest 
correlation with fair use outcomes in the United States, factor four 
had the strongest correlation during the period before the transform-
ative use approach came to dominate U.S. fair use case law. Indeed, 
in his empirical study of fair use case law from 1978 to 2005, Barton 
Beebe reported a near perfect correlation between judicial findings 
                                                                                                             
192 Liu, supra note 44, at 184-5, 198.  
193 Id. at 185. 
194 Id. 
195 See Premier League; Safecom;    
196 We refer to the commercial character of the use and whether the defendant 
gave authorship credit as “factors” rather than “sub-factors” because Israeli courts 
treat authorship credit and, sometimes, commercial character, as independent fac-
tors rather than subsuming them within the first statutory factor or any other stat-
utory factor. 
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on factor four and fair use outcomes.197 That result comported with 
the U.S. Supreme Court dictum in Harper & Row v. Nation Enter-
prises, characterizing the fourth factor "the single most important 
element of fair use."198 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., de-
cided in 1994, some nine years after Harper & Row, the Supreme 
Court flatly contradicted the Harper & Row dictum, even if it did 
not expressly overrule it. The Campbell Court underscored that 
courts are to consider all four statutory factors, without any single 
factor being the most important.199 Further, the first factor has now 
eclipsed the fourth factor in importance and degree of correlation 
with fair use outcomes. Nonetheless, lower courts in the U.S. con-
tinue to cite the Harper & Row dictum that the fourth factor is the 
single most important. One-fourth of the rulings in our U.S. Study 
cited the dictum. 
Whatever the continuing force of the Harper & Row dictum 
in the United States, it has had negligible influence in Israel. That is 
not surprising. After all, less than one-third of the rulings in our Is-
rael Study apply factor four and no Israeli ruling has cited Harper 
& Row. Only one Israeli ruling in our data set stated that factor four 
is the most important. Four rulings stated expressly that factor four 
is not the most important and that all the factors should be consid-
ered equally. Forty-nine rulings, amounting to 89.1% the rulings in 
our Israel Study, made no reference at all to the relative importance 
of factor four. 
Finally, in what may mark a departure from American fair 
use jurisprudence, the Israeli Supreme Court in Nestle, has recently 
put forth an original conceptual framework for the four factors anal-
ysis. Copyright law, the Court held, aims to encourage the creation 
of works for the purpose of enriching the public domain:200 The pur-
pose of fair use, is to limit copyright, to ensure that it is appropriately 
balanced to achieve its goals, and to ensure it does not unduly con-
strain public access to works without justification.201  
Within that framework, the Court classified the factors into 
three broad considerations based on the theoretical foundation of 
                                                                                                             
197 Beebe, supra note 41, at 617. 
198 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, ----.  
199 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994), stating that 
"all [four factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of 
the purposes of copyright." 
200 Nestle, at 31.  
201 Id., at p 32.  
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copyright law. The Court characterized the four factors as tests to 
assist the court in applying these considerations in particular circum-
stances. The first consideration explores the extent to which the al-
legedly infringing work promotes socially valuable objectives, 
including that of encouraging creation. This consideration is re-
flected in factor one (the purpose and character of use) and factor 
two (the nature of the protected work).202 The second consideration 
is the extent by which the allegedly infringing use impairs the cop-
yright holder’s incentives, by compromising his control over the use 
of his work and its economic exploitation.203 This consideration is 
reflected in factor four (effect on the value of work and its potential 
market) and factor three (the scope of use).204 The third considera-
tion is proportionality. It explores the extent to which the actual use 
of the original work in the allegedly infringing copy, serves the gen-
eral purpose of the allegedly infringing work. Factor three (the scope 
of use) and factor one (the purpose and character of use) reflect this 
consideration.   
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the four factors are 
simply tests to assist the court in applying the three considerations, 
the Court in Nestle nevertheless proceeded to carefully analyze each 
of the factors. It remains to be seen whether this new conceptual 
framework for the four factors will affect their relative weight in 
determining fair use outcomes, and how this framework will affect 
the overall analysis of fair use cases. 
 
5. Transformative Use 
Within the last two decades, the transformative use approach 
has come completely to dominate U.S. fair use jurisprudence. As we 
have noted, in his recent exhaustive empirical study of transforma-
tive use in U.S. copyright law from the Copyright Act of 1976 
through 2016, Jiarui Liu reports that during the final decade of his 
study nearly 90 percent of U.S. fair use rulings addressed whether 
the allegedly infringing use is transformative.205 Liu’s study also 
                                                                                                             
202 Id., p. 34  
203 Id. 
204 The Court noted that there might be a tension between these two considera-
tions, for instance, when a work promotes an important social goal but may cause 
economic harm to the rights holder.  
205 Liu, supra note 44, at 177. 
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shows significant correlations between fair use outcomes and judi-
cial findings regarding whether a use is transformative. Finally, as 
Liu demonstrates, a finding that a use is transformative profoundly 
impacts judicial analysis of fair use factors one, three, and four.206  
Not surprisingly, our U.S. Study comports with Liu’s find-
ings. During the period of our study, courts explicitly addressed 
whether the defendant’s use was transformative in 82.7% of the 
cases. Further, in an additional 14.2% of the cases, courts applied 
the transformative use approach by expressly addressing the key 
definition of what constitutes a “transformative use,” whether the 
defendant’s expressive purpose differs from that of the plaintiff, 
even if the court did not expressly use the word “transformative.”  
Together, these amount to almost 97% of the cases in our U.S. 
Study. And, notably, although courts during the final two years of 
our U.S. Study were less likely to find the defendant’s use to qualify 
as transformative than previously, they continued to consider 
whether the use is transformative in almost every case.207 
By comparison, the Israel Study demonstrates that the trans-
formative use approach made a small dent in Israeli fair use case 
law, but its influence remained marginal. Only eight Israeli rulings, 
14.5% of the total, mentioned the word “transformative.” And, of 
those, only six rulings, 10.9% of the total, expressly found whether 
or not the allegedly infringing use in question was transformative. 
Likewise, very few rulings considered or gave any weight to 
whether the alleged infringer’s expressive purpose differed from 
that of the author of the copied work. Only two cases found that the 
alleged infringer had a different expressive purpose and that this fact 
weighed in favor of fair use.  
Nonetheless, in those few instances in which Israeli courts 
did determine whether the use in question was transformative, the 
findings correlated 100% with fair use outcomes.208  In all three of 
the cases in which the court held that the use was transformative, it 
ruled that the use was fair use. In all three in which the court held 
that the use was not transformative, it ruled against fair use.  Thus, 
                                                                                                             
206 Liu, supra note 44, at 190 (factor two), 194-95 (factor three), and 198-99 (fac-
tor four). 
207 See supra note _. 
208 In line with that 100% correlation in those few cases in which Israeli courts 
did rule on whether the use is transformative, there was a statistically significant 
correlation overall between the Israeli courts’ finding on transformative use and 
fair use outcomes (Fisher’s exact test two-sided p<=0.0284)-- even though almost 
90% of the rulings did not even mention transformative use.   
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at least within the very small set of cases in which Israeli courts did 
determine whether the allegedly infringing use was transformative, 
Israeli jurisprudence aligned with the transformative use approach 
that dominates U.S. fair use doctrine. In both countries, a finding of 
whether the defendant’s use is transformative heavily correlates 
with fair use outcome.   
In addition, Israel’s Supreme Court has been considerably 
more receptive to U.S. transformative use doctrine than have its 
lower courts. Out of the handful of cases in our Israel Study that 
expressly addressed transformative use, two are Supreme Court rul-
ings. Citing Campbell, the Supreme Court in Football Association 
Premier League Ltd opined that it is easier to define a transforma-
tive use than a non-transformative use as “fair.”209  Transformative 
uses, the Court continued, fulfill the purpose of the fair use excep-
tion, which is to promote creation and enrich the accumulation of 
knowledge by society. Moreover, the Court noted, in many cases, a 
transformative use neither substitutes for the protected work nor oth-
erwise competes with it. As a result, transformative uses generally 
cause no economic harm to authors’ incentives to create. Ultimately, 
however, the Court rejected the defendant’s fair use claim. It held 
that streaming an original broadcast “as is,” in a manner that serves 
exactly the same purpose and aims to reach precisely the same au-
dience as the original does not constitute a transformative use. 210  
In Safecom v Raviv,211 the Supreme Court alluded to the im-
portance of transformative use, citing American empirical stud-
ies.212 Yet, finding against fair use, the Court held that defendant’s 
near exact copy of the plaintiff’s patent application drawings did not 
qualify as transformative use. As the Court stated, “it does not ap-
pear that the Respondent's use of the Safecom drawings led to the 
creation of a new expression, different from the original expression 
embodied in them.”213  
                                                                                                             
 209  Civil Appeal 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v. 
Anonymous (2012).  For an English translation of the district court decision see 
CC (TA) 1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (Sept. 2, 
2009) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-1636-11.doc. 
210 Id. The Israeli Supreme Court’s holding is consistent with prevailing U.S. fair 
use doctrine. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when an original work is 
merely retransmitted in a different medium.”) 
211 CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv (Isr. Nov. 18, 2013), English translation 
available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/safecom-ltd-v-raviv. 
212 Safecom, at 20 (citing Beebe, supra note 41, and Netanel, supra note 40).  
213 Id. 
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Finally, in its recent seminal decision in Nestle,214 the Israeli 
Supreme Court fully embraced the transformative use approach that 
currently dominates U.S. fair use case law.  Nestle, the owner of the 
successful global brand Nespresso, sued a local Israeli coffee com-
pany, Espresso Club, over Espresso Club’s TV commercial cam-
paign mocking Nespresso’s original commercials featuring the 
American star, George Clooney.  
In a decision that is heavily based on U.S. judicial rulings 
and law review articles, the Court found for the defendant, conclud-
ing that the mocking commercial amounts to fair use. The Court 
highlighted the significance of transformative use, as a central test 
of fair use considered by the courts in the US and in Israel.215 The 
importance of the transformative test arises from its link to the pur-
pose of copyright law: to enrich the public domain with creative 
works. The public domain does not gain from mere copying a work 
without any additional creativity, and it is therefore difficult to jus-
tify the harm such copying may cause to the incentives of the origi-
nal author. However, when the defendant has used the original work 
to create something different and new, the justification for allowing 
the original author to prevent the distribution of the second work is 
called into question. Citing Campbell, the Court stated that trans-
formativeness involves an inquiry into the extent to which the de-
fendant’s work is of a different character, or innovative compared to 
the original work, and whether it has an additional tier or dimen-
sion.216  
The use at issue in Nestle was a parody, a paradigmatic trans-
formative use. It was a work of different character, which had a dif-
ferent essence and communicated a different message. It thus raises 
the question whether uses, like Google Book Search’s mass digiti-
zation of books, that involve exact copying of the entire original 
work for a fundamentally different, socially beneficial purpose 
might qualify as a transformative use and a fair use.217 While Israeli 
courts have yet to rule on technological uses like mass digitization, 
lower courts have accepted fair use claims involving exact copying 
                                                                                                             
214 C.A. 3425/17 (August 7, 2019). 
215 Id. at 44. The Court cited Safecome and Premier League.    
216 Id. at 43. 
217 An Israeli copyright infringement action against Google regarding Google 
Book Search met defeat when an Israeli district court ruled that the lawsuit was 
ineligible for a class action, without reaching the issue of fair use, and the plaintiff 
withdrew his appeal at the recommendation of the Supreme Court. CA 230/12 
Jonathan Brauner v. Google Inc., September 11, 2013. 
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for different purposes without making any express reference to 
transformative use. Those uses have including copying a chorogra-
phy for the purpose of learning,218 replication of portions of a copy-
righted newspaper interview on a politician’s website,219  the posting 
of a copyrighted photograph on a Facebook page of an NGO advo-
cating animals’ rights,220 and the pulling of blog posts entries and 
headlines by an online news website using RSS.221 In any event, it 
remains to be seen whether subsequent Israeli cases will broadly ap-
ply the transformative use approach and, if so, whether that will 
translate into more favorable fair use outcomes for defendants as it 
has in the United States.  
  
6. The Factors that Drive Israeli Fair Use 
Our Israel Study identified four factors that had a statistically 
significant correlation with fair use outcomes and that were applied 
by courts in enough cases to provide a possible explanation for what 
has driven Israeli fair use outcomes and doctrine. We note that given 
the relatively small size of our data set and given that each of those 
factors had a strong, independent statistically significant correlation 
with fair use outcome, logistic regression analysis is not suited to 
our study. We, accordingly, look to bivariate correlations and an as-
sessment of the number of cases in which courts rule on the relevant 
factor to determine the extent to which that factor might explain fair 
use outcomes. 
We also compare Israeli court treatment of these factors with 
that of U.S. courts. In so doing, we identify a sharp distinction be-
tween Israeli and U.S. fair use doctrine during the ten-year period of 
our study. With one exception, none of the factors that correlate sig-
nificantly with fair use outcomes in Israel correlate significantly 
with fair use outcomes in the United States. Indeed, the potentially 
highly influential factors in Israel generally have a decided margin-
ally impact on fair use outcomes and doctrine in the U.S. 
 
                                                                                                             
218 CC 8303/06 Mejula v. Hanan Cohen (District Court Jerusalem, 2008).  
219 CC 57588-05-12 Danon PR Telecommunications v. Shelly Yachimovich (Dis-
trict Court Tel Aviv, 2012).  
220 CC 48263-11-13 Ronen v. Let the Animals Live ( Magistrate Court of Reishon 
Letizion, 2016).  
221 CC 45536-07-11 Tomer Apfeldorf v. Yoav Itzhak (Magistrate court of 
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a. Commercial Use 
As discussed in Part III, the U.S. copyright industries who 
lobbied against Israel’s adoption of fair use raised particular concern 
that, as drafted, Israel’s fair use provision omits any express mention 
of the commercial nature of the use and would thus encourage Israeli 
courts to liberally award fair use to commercial uses of copyright-
protected works.  
 Ironically, however, our Israel Study reveals that, in fact, 
Israeli courts appear to have weighed the commercial nature of the 
use far more heavily against fair use than do their U.S. counterparts. 
In our Israel Study, over 90% of the 23 rulings that found that the 
allegedly infringing use was commercial proceeded to reject the fair 
use defense.222 Conversely, in 6 out 7 cases (85.7%) in which the 
court explicitly found that the use was not commercial, the court 
ruled in favor of fair use, also a statistically significant correla-
tion.223  
By contrast, our U.S. Study further found that the court ruled 
against the defendant on fair use in only half the cases in which the 
court characterized the use as commercial. In the United States, a 
judicial finding that the defendant’s use was commercial thus corre-
lated with the court’s rejection of the defendant’s fair use defendants 
with no higher odds than would be predicted from flipping a coin. 
On the other hand, when courts characterized the use as non-com-
mercial, they ruled, similarly to Israeli courts, that the use was fair 
use in an overwhelming 83.9% of the cases.224 Finally, when U.S. 
courts characterized the use as both commercial and transformative, 
they ruled that the use was fair use in 80% of the cases and that the 
use was not fair use in only 8.9% of the cases (with the remainder 
either questions of fact or mixed). 
  
                                                                                                             
222 A two-sided measure of statistical correlation between finding that use is com-
mercial and fair use outcome is Chi-Square p=0.0048. 
223 Per the Fisher’s exact test, the two-sided measure of statistical correlation be-
tween finding that use is not commercial and fair use outcome is two-sided p<= 
0.0016. 
224 All in all the correlation between commercial character and fair use outcome 
was statistically significant, at Pearson Chi Square p = 0.005. 
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The striking difference between Israel and the U.S. in fair 
use outcomes when the court finds the use to be commercial is also 
reflected in the respective courts’ express statements about the 
weight to be accorded the commercial nature of the use in fair use 
analysis. In our Israel Study, 47% of the rulings expressly stated that 
the commercial nature of the use is to be weighed against fair use.225 
Of these, seven rulings stated expressly that no commercial use may 
qualify as fair use and 13 rulings stated that the commercial nature 
of the use is an important, but not disqualifying, factor weighing 
against fair use. Further, another six rulings expressly weighed the 
commercial nature of the use heavily against fair use without speci-
fying whether commercial nature disqualifies a use from being fair 
use or merely weighs significantly against it..Only one ruling stated 
that the commercial nature of the use is of marginal weight in deter-
mining fair use. 
By contrast, our U.S. Study found that no court stated that a 
commercial use may never be a fair use and only 11.3% of the rul-
ings stated that commercial uses are generally presumed to be unfair 
and/or to cause market harm. Further, in 37.8% of the rulings, U.S. 
courts expressly minimized the importance of the commercial nature 
                                                                                                             
225 Of those rulings, 48% defined commercial use as a use that is designed to reap 
a profit and 36%, more broadly, a use designed to reap any benefit for the defend-
ant, including enhancement to reputation. An additional 16% did not define com-
mercial use. No Israeli court used the phraseology that appears in some U.S. fair 
use cases to the effect that a commercial use in one in which the defendant fails 
to pay the customary price for the use. 
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of the use, such as by stating that if the use is transformative, the 
commercial character weighs little against fair use.  
Notably, however, the Israeli Supreme Court’s recent ruling 
in Nestle appears to signal a closer alignment of Israeli and U.S. fair 
use on the issue of commercial use. In Nestle, the Court stated that 
the Knesset’s omission of explicit reference to the commercial na-
ture of the use in Section 19(b)(1) was meant to clarify that fair use 
is not to be categorically denied to commercial uses.226 Rather, in 
line with U.S. fair use doctrine, courts are to consider both the use’s 
commercial nature and whether the use is transformative, but must 
give less weight to the former than the latter.227 As with other aspects 
of the Court’s ruling in Nestle, it remains to be seen how lower 
courts will interpret and apply that clarification regarding commer-
cial use.  
 
b. Authorship attribution 
The defendant’s failure to give authorship attribution ap-
peared to weigh heavily against fair use in our Israel Study. Courts’ 
ruling on fair use defenses found that the defendant had failed to 
give the author adequate credit in 22 cases, or 40% of the cases in 
our data set. The court rejected the defendant’s fair use defense in 
all but one of those cases.228 
Some further explanation is in order. Israel’s Copyright Law 
2007 recognizes authors’ moral right of attribution.229 The author’s 
moral right of attribution, namely to have his name identified with 
his work, is limited to “the extent and in the manner suitable in the 
circumstances.”230 As in other countries, under Israeli law, the au-
thor’s moral right is a personal right that is distinct from the author’s 
copyright.231 By the same token, fair use applies only to any unau-
thorized use of copyright owner’s economic rights, not the moral 
right of attribution. Unlike some statutory fair dealing and fair use 
                                                                                                             
226 C.A. 3425/17 (August 7, 2019), at para 31.  
227 Id. at, para 30. 
228 The correlation between failure to give authorship credit and fair use outcome 
is statistically significant, at Pearson Chi Square p = 0.0011. 
229 Moral rights under the 2007 Act consist of the right of attribution Section 46(1) 
and the right to protect the integrity of the work against distortion that may be 
prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation (section 46(2)). 
230 Id. 
231 See, generally, MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, 
PRACTICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
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provisions in other countries, Section 19 does not explicitly require 
authorship attribution as a condition to the fair use defense.232 None-
theless, our Israel Study demonstrated that courts have repeatedly 
considered the lack of attribution in determining fair use.  
Authors brought a claim for infringement of their moral right 
of attribution in addition to a claim of copyright infringement in 
56.4% of the fair use cases in our Israel Study. The court ruled that 
the defendant had infringed the author’s moral right of attribution 
by failing to give the author adequate credit in 22 of those cases. As 
just noted, the court rejected the fair use defense to the author’s cop-
yright infringement claim in all but one of those 22 cases. 
By contrast, the defendant’s failure to give authorship attrib-
ution is virtually a non-issue in the United States, where the Copy-
right Act contains no general recognition of authors’ moral right. In 
our U.S. Study, only two rulings (1.1% of the total) stated that fail-
ure to give authorship attribution can weigh against fair use -- and 
two rulings state the opposite, that failure to give credit to the author 
is irrelevant. Nor does the fact that the defendant gave authorship 
attribution generally weigh in favor of fair use. Only three rulings 
(1.6%) in our U.S. Study stated that giving authorship attribution 
can weigh in favor of fair use, and one expressly stated that that fact 
that the defendant credited the author was irrelevant to fair use anal-
ysis.  
A handful of U.S. fair use rulings prior to the 10-year period 
of our study gave some weight to authorship attribution.233 But our 
empirical study and careful reading of fair use doctrine reinforce our 
conclusion that authorship attribution generally weighs little, if at 
all, in U.S. fair use case law. As an earlier study concludes, despite 
                                                                                                             
232 Fair dealing provisions in several countries require reasonable authorship at-
tribution as a condition to qualifying for the defense. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The 
Most Moral of Rights: The Right to be Recognized as the Author of One’s Work, 
8 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 44, 53 n. 30 (2016) (citing fair dealing provisions 
of several countries, including the U.K.). Some newly enacted fair use provisions 
explicitly require authorship attribution as well. See, e.g., Republic of South Af-
rica, Copyright Amendment Bill B 13B—2017, Section 12A(c) (enacted, but not 
yet signed into law); Section 184.1(e) of the Intellectual Property Code of the 
Philippines (Republic Act No. 8293) (requiring authorship attribution for certain 
uses). 
233 See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 
2000) (newspaper’s attribution of authorship weighed in favor of fair use); Weiss-
mann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) (Plagiarism weighed 
against fair use). . See also, Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
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courts’ occasional reference to authorship attribution as an equitable 
consideration for fair use, it is “most certainly not the case” that “at-
tribution is regularly considered by courts as a factor in the fair use 
analysis.”234 Again, that stands in sharp contrast to the considerable 
weight given to authorship attribution by Israeli courts.  
Having said that, however, the Israeli Supreme Court’s re-
cent ruling in Nestle might move Israeli fair use doctrine closer to 
that of the U.S. along this vector as well. Nestle did not hold explic-
itly that failure to give authorship attribution is irrelevant to fair use. 
But it repeatedly highlighted the distinction between an author’s 
moral rights and the economic rights of the copyright owner, and 
stated that an author’s recourse for violation of his or her moral 
rights lies only in the moral rights provisions of the Copyright Law 
2007, not in the copyright provisions.235 Further, the fact that the 
Nespresso had failed to credit the author of the creative expression 
that it copied was conspicuously absent from the Court’s fair use 
analysis.236 The Court did not even mention the defendant’s failure 
to give authorship attribution, let alone give it any weight. 
 
c. The defendant’s purpose of use  
 As discussed above, Section 19 of the Israel Copyright Law 
2007 sets out a two-part test for fair use. Section 19(a) provides: 
“Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as private study, 
research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or in-
struction and examination by an educational institution.” In contrast 
to Israel’s previous fair dealing exception, Section 19(a) is meant to 
set out an open list of permissible purposes. Uses other than the enu-
merated uses may qualify as fair use. However, to qualify as fair use, 
the defendant’s use must be “such as” one or more of the enumerated 
uses in some way. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Nestle, Sec-
tion 19 sets out two requirements for a finding of fair use: purpose 
and fairness. The Court explicitly held that “the language of section 
19(a) does not allow renouncing the purpose test as an independent 
                                                                                                             
234 Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. 
L. REV. 41, 88 (2007). 
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preliminary test.”237 At the same time, as discussed above, Israeli 
courts broadly interpreted the purpose test.238  
In our Israel Study, 19 rulings (35.5% of the total) expressly 
found that the defendant’s use was not one of the uses enumerated 
in Section 19(a). In all but two of those 19 rulings, the court rejected 
the defendant’s fair use defense, yielding a statistically significant 
correlation between fair use outcome and a finding that the defend-
ant’s use is not one of the enumerated uses.239 Notably, moreover, 
none of those rulings analyzed whether the use in question was 
“such as” one or more of the enumerated uses. This suggests that 
Israeli courts might be continuing to apply the approach from the 
previous fair dealing regime, in which only enumerated uses could 
qualify for the fair dealing defense, rather than the more open (alt-
hough not entirely open) regime set out in Section 19. In that vein, 
only 18% of rulings explicitly acknowledged that the list of enumer-
ated purposes is an open-ended list. 
On the other hand, in 65% of the cases in our Israel Study 
the court did not explicitly find that the use failed to satisfy the pur-
pose test.  In these cases, the court found the use to be for one of the 
purposes enumerated by the clause, or simply ignored the purpose 
test all together. In sum, it is not clear whether the 17 rulings that 
denied fair use after finding that the defendant’s use was not one of 
the enumerated purposes were path-dependently applying the previ-
ous closed-list fair dealing regime or simply concluding without dis-
cussion that the defendant’s use was neither an enumerated use nor 
“such as” the enumerated uses. 
Regardless of the explanation for why Israeli courts seem to 
apply the Section 19(a) purpose test restrictively, Israeli doctrine 
differs from that of the U.S. on this issue by imposing an additional 
obstacle before defendants who claim fair use. Section 107 of the 
U.S. Copyright Act also prefaces the list of enumerated uses in the 
preambular clause with the phrase “such as.” But in its definitions 
                                                                                                             
237 Société des Produits Nestle at . See also Niva Elkin-Koren, Users' Rights, in 
CREATING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Birnhack 
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section, the U.S. Copyright Act provides explicitly that the “terms 
‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative and not dispositive.”240  
Accordingly, U.S. courts interpret Section 107 to set out a 
fully open list of examples of the types of uses that can qualify as 
fair use.241 U.S. courts occasionally state that the fact that the de-
fendant’s use does not fall within one of the illustrative categories 
of fair use weighs against fair use.242 However, Beebe concluded, 
based on the regression model in his empirical study of U.S. fair use 
case law, that “when controlling for the effects of other findings, a 
finding that the defendant’s use fell within one of the preambular 
categories did not significantly affect the outcome of the fair use 
test.”243  
 
d. Defendant’s Bad Faith 
 Our Israel Study found a statistically significant correlation 
between fair use outcome and courts’ ruling on whether the defend-
ant had used the plaintiff’s work in good faith. Israeli courts ruled in 
favor of fair use in every one of the 4 cases in which the court found 
that the defendant had acted in good faith and against fair use in 
every one of the 12 cases in which the court found that the defendant 
had not acted in good faith. But the fact that Israeli courts addressed 
the issue of the defendant’s good faith in just 16 cases, slightly less 
than a third of our data set, suggests that this factor has somewhat 
weaker explanatory power for fair use outcomes than do the com-
mercial character of the use, authorship credit, and a judicial finding 
that the defendant’s use did not meet the purpose test.  
 Our U.S. Study found that the issue of whether the defendant 
acted in good faith is quite marginal in the U.S. fair use doctrine. In 
our U.S. Study, only 18 rulings (just under 10% of the total) ad-
dressed the issue of whether the defendant acted in good faith, and 
of those, three rulings stated that the defendant’s good or bad faith 
                                                                                                             
240 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
241 See, e.g. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694,706 (2nd Cir. 2013 ) (stating that “a 
secondary work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some purpose other than 
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Inc., 510 U.S. at 577.) 
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Cir. 1998). 
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is irrelevant to whether the defendant’s use qualifies as fair use.244 
Likewise, Beebe’s empirical study of fair use cases found that, while 
a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the copyright infringe-
ment defendant correlated significantly with the court’s rejection of 
the fair use defense, only 16% of the cases made reference to the 
propriety of the defendant’s conduct. Further, Beebe’s regression 
analysis suggested that a finding of bad faith served little role in fair 
use outcomes keeping other factors and subfactors constant.245 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In campaigning against the adoption of fair use outside the 
United States, the U.S. copyright industry warn policy makers 
around the world that introducing fair use would undermine copy-
right protection. They contend that courts in other countries lack the 
capacity to carefully craft the scope of a privileged use, and insist 
that the adoption of fair use would thus lead to unrestrained copying. 
Our empirical study of fair use case law in one country to 
have adopted fair use outside the U.S., finds no evidence to substan-
tiate these claims. We find, indeed, that during the first decade in 
which Israel’s statutory fair use provision was in effect, Israeli 
courts were quite restrained in accepting fair use defense compared 
to their U.S. counterparts, rejecting fair use defenses in 70.9% of the 
cases, compared with a mere 40.5% rejection rate by U.S. courts. 
While the courts of other countries that adopt fair use might be more 
receptive to fair use defenses than have Israeli courts, our case study 
makes clear, at the very least, that the USTR should give no weight 
to mere fact that a country has adopted fair use in determining 
whether that country should face the threat of trade sanctions for 
inadequate intellectual property protection. 
Our study further reveals that, notwithstanding Israel’s en-
actment of statutory language that was almost identical to Section 
107, Israeli courts developed an independent jurisprudence of fair 
use, putting weight on factors that have generally played an insig-
nificant role in determining fair use outcomes in the U.S. These fac-
tors include the commercial nature of the defendant’s use, the 
defendant’s failure to give authorship credit, the purpose of use, and 
the extent to which the defendant acted in bad faith. At the same 
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time, however, the Israeli Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to 
U.S. fair use case law for guidance. As we have discussed, indeed, 
the Court’s recent ruling in Nestle might move Israeli fair use juris-
prudence closer to that of the U.S. even if Nestle pronounced a 
uniquely Israeli framework for the four statutory fair use factors. 
Our findings may offer some important lessons to countries 
considering the adoption of the fair use exception in their copyright 
law. Most importantly, introducing a fair use provision need not, in 
itself, lead to unrestrained copying. Far from being a license to un-
authorized copying, fair use offers a conceptual framework for a so-
phisticated legal analysis weighing the conflicting values and 
considerations promoted by copyright law.  
Our study has further demonstrated that courts may play a 
moderating role, even when empowered with broad discretion. Alt-
hough fair use is an open-ended norm which seemingly accords 
courts wide discretion, judicial decisions in our study reflected a 
considerable degree of path dependency. Israeli courts followed a 
relatively conservative approach that heavily relied on the legal tra-
dition which preceded the Knesset’s enactment of fair use. Our find-
ings suggest that, to a large extent, Israeli court’s interpretation of 
the fair use provision looked to the fair dealing framework which 
preceded the fair use reform. In particular, in part because of how 
the Knesset drafted Section 19, Israeli courts have continued the fair 
dealing distinction between the purpose test and the fairness test, 
interpreting Section 19 to require the purpose of use as a precondi-
tion to fair use. U.S. courts have taken a different path in their inter-
pretation of the statutory language of section 107.    
This path dependency of courts should not come as a sur-
prise. Judicial decisions are shaped by precedent and by briefs sub-
mitted by the litigants. The conceptual framework applied by judges 
and litigators is further shaped by their training and experience un-
der the previous law. Courts may play an important role in legal re-
form, but they are generally bounded by their legal tradition and 
their local legal culture. Consequently, even broad discretion ac-
corded to judges by an open-ended fair use norm, is unlikely to re-
sult in dramatic change overnight.        
Finally, our findings underscore the role of courts in copy-
right reform, and their contribution to the integration of a legal trans-
plant in local copyright law. While fair use opponents express 
concern about delegating to courts a semi-legislative power to craft 
copyright exemptions for new uses, our study suggests that courts 
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are not only capable of carefully developing legal norms, but also of 
doing so in a manner that is bound by local legal culture. This could 
be an important feature in localizing global copyright norms.    
We hope that our study inspires additional, companion studies 
of how fair use has been applied in other countries that have adopted 
the privilege. Such studies would shed greater light on how fair use 
is actually transplanted outside the United States. They would pro-
vide the necessary empirical data to compare transplanting coun-
tries’ approaches to fair use with one another and with evolving fair 
use doctrine in the United States.  
 
